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TAKING THE “FAM” OUT OF FAMILY:
ADJUDICATING THE STATE DEPARTMENT’S
DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT OF SAME-SEX
PARENTS ON THE MERITS
Camrin M. Rivera*
ABSTRACT
Cisgender same-sex male married couples, unlike cisgender opposite-sex
married couples, will always require artificial reproductive technology (ART) for at
least one of the spouses to attain biological parenthood. Due to legal and financial
barriers to ART, many of these couples turn to international ART services to grow
their families. In doing so, these families may face immigration battles when they
apply for recognition of their child’s United States citizenship. For example, a prior
State Department policy sparked three lawsuits after the State Department refused to
recognize children as United States citizens from birth because the children were not
biologically related to both of their cisgender same-sex male married parents.
Because it is currently impossible for both parents in a cisgendered same-sex male
marriage to be biologically related to their child, these families have been forced to
litigate and challenge the constitutionality of the State Department’s policy. This
Comment summarizes the relevant immigration law and the State Department policy
that has resulted in this disparate treatment of married cisgendered same-sex parents
and their children. In addition, this Comment outlines the three of the resulting
lawsuits brought by such parents after their children were denied United States
Citizenship—as well as the shortcoming that stem from the court’s failure to
adjudicate the claims on the merits. Finally, this Comment provides a framework
for how courts ought to adjudicate such claims and argues that analyzing the
constitutional rights of married cisgendered same-sex male parents is needed to best
protect similarly situated families. In doing so, this Comment posits that the
Supreme Court’s broad sweeping and compelling reasoning in Bostock v. Clayton
County might be used to provide further constitutional protections for these
LGBTQIA individuals.
INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you have just married the love of your life. Prior to getting married,
you and your spouse agreed that your marriage will involve raising children, and you
both cannot wait to begin growing your family. Either through marriage or some
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other immigration process, you have both established your United States citizenship
and you plan to raise your children within the United States. However, because you
are in a cisgender same-sex male marriage, you are not able to biologically conceive
a child on your own. So, you begin to investigate your options, finding Assisted
Reproductive Technology (ART) as a way for at least one of you to be biologically
connected to your future child.
Broadly speaking, ART refers to any “method of causing pregnancy other than
sexual intercourse” and includes procedures like in vitro fertilization (IVF) and
artificial insemination.1 The use of ART has increased fifty-seven percent in recent
years,2 and nearly 81,500 children were born in the United States as a result of ART
in 2018 alone.3 Although some of these numbers are in part due to cisgender
opposite-sex couples utilizing ART for increased fertility, many cisgender same-sex
male couples utilize, or plan to utilize, ART to grow their families. 4
Cisgender same-sex male couples, unlike cisgender opposite-sex couples, will
always need to utilize ART to attain biological parenthood. This is because they will
always require participation of at least one third party: a surrogate and, most often,
an egg donor.5 There are two types of surrogacy arrangements available for
cisgender same-sex male couples: traditional surrogacy and gestational surrogacy.6
Traditional surrogacy involves utilizing the sperm of the father and fertilizing the

1. 19-A M.R.S. § 1832(3) (2021). The federal government defines ART as fertility procedures and
treatments that require the handling of eggs or embryos; however, this definition is overly narrow because
it does not include artificial insemination (“AI”), which raises similar legal issues to federally recognized
ART procedures. Jenna Casolo et al., Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 20 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 313,
313-14, 315 (2019) (“The U.S. Code defines Assisted Reproductive Technology . . . as any treatment or
procedure that includes the handling of human eggs (oocytes) or embryos.”). Many states have also
included AI within their family law definitions of ART. See, e.g., 19-A M.R.S. § 1832(3) (2021) (defining
assisted reproduction within the Maine Parentage Act to include “[i]ntrauterine or vaginal insemination”
and “[i]n vitro fertilization and transfer of embryos”); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 581-102 (McKenney 2001)
(defining assisted reproduction within the Family Court Act to include “[i]ntrauterine or vaginal
insemination” and “[i]n vitro fertilization and transfer of embryos”). Thus, this Comment takes the
broader definition for ART, subsuming AI.
2. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, DIV. REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH, 2015 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY NATIONAL SUMMARY REPORT 50 (2017). The birth rate of children born as a result of
ART increased by nearly 57% between 2006 (54,656 births) and 2015 (71,169 births). Id. at 50.
3. The use of ART has doubled over the last decade, and 81,478 newborn infants in 2018 were
conceived through ART. ART Success Rate, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, https://www.cdc.gov/art/
artdata/index.html [https://perma.cc/9RN8-MUSK] (last visited Dec. 23, 2021).
4. See FAM. EQUALITY, LGBTQ FAMILY BUILDING SURVEY, 2 (2019) (reporting that “77% of
LGBTQ Millennials (aged 18-35) are either already parents or are considering having children”); Julie
Compton, LGBTQ Families Poised for ‘Dramatic Growth,’ National Survey Finds, NBC NEWS (Feb. 7,
2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/lgbtq-families-poised-dramatic-growth-national-sur
vey-finds-n968776 [https://perma.cc/Z6JW-LYTE] (reporting that “[w]hile the current percentage of
LGBTQ people who use ART to have children is only around five percent, [forty] percent of them are
currently considering it”).
5. Scott C. Mackenzie, Dita Wickins-Drazilova, & Jeremy Wickins, The Ethics of Fertility
Treatment for Same-Sex Couples: Considerations for a Modern Fertility Clinic, 244 EUR. J. OBSTETRICS
& GYNECOLOGY & REPROD. BIOLOGY 71, 72 (2020).
6. Wendy Norton, Nicky Hudson, & Lorraine Culley, Gay Men Seeking Surrogacy to Achieve
Parenthood, 27 REPROD. BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 271, 273 (2013).
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egg taken from the surrogate.7 Gestational surrogacy, on the other hand, involves
fertilizing a donated egg with the sperm of the father, which is then implanted into
the gestational surrogate.8 Gestational surrogacy is the more prevalent form9 and is
“estimated to represent 95% of all surrogacy arrangements.”10
However, cisgender same-sex male couples often face substantial legal and
economic barriers to utilizing ART services. For example, gestational surrogacy can
cost parents more than $100,000, which is typically not covered by insurance
providers,11 and the cost can increase substantially when parents begin to factor in
multiple rounds of IVF, genetic testing, and surgical procedures. 12 In addition, less
than half of the states have addressed gestational surrogacy within a statute, and some
states have not addressed the legality of gestational surrogacy at all. 13 Other states
have refused to recognize and enforce surrogacy contracts altogether. 14 Even in
some of the states that permit surrogacy arrangements, cisgender same-sex male
couples may still be excluded because the state may require that all genetic materials
come from both of the intended parents.15
Another legal and financial barrier may stem from a cisgender same-sex male
couple’s need to hire an attorney with expertise in Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual,
Transgender, Queer or Questioning, Intersex, and Asexual (LGBTQIA) family law
to assure that both intended parents are recognized as the child’s legal parents. 16 This
is because many state laws are written in a way that presumes parentage through
marriage only when the intended parent is married to the gestational parent.17 Thus,
for a cisgender same-sex male couple, where neither spouse can be the gestational
parent, the couple is “excluded from the marriage-based avenues of establishing

7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Jessica Feinberg, After Marriage Equality: Dual Fatherhood for Married Male Same-Sex
Couples, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1507, 1524 (2021).
11. David Kaufman, The Fight for Fertility Equality, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2020), https://www.
nytimes.com/2020/07/22/style/lgbtq-fertility-surrogacy-coverage.html [https://perma.cc/N6FT-RBE2].
12. Amy Klein, I.V.F. is Expensive. Here’s How to Bring Down the Cost., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/article/ivf-treatment-costs-guide.html [https://perma.cc/5UWZ-PH
YA].
13. Feinberg, supra note 10, at 1524.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1526 (“[A] few jurisdictions restrict eligibility by requiring that gametes from at least one
of the intended parents be used to conceive the child. Louisiana and North Dakota go even further,
requiring that gametes from both of the intended parents be used to conceive the child—thereby excluding
cisgender male same-sex couples from eligibility.”).
16. See id. at 1509. “[I]f one member of the couple is unable to establish legal parentage, they will
lack important parental rights relating to, inter alia, custody, visitation, and medical decision-making . . .
[and] the child will be deprived of important rights relating to, inter alia, support, inheritance, healthcare,
and social security.” Id. In addition, some states that have addressed gestational surrogacy through a
statute or through common law require that all parties have legal representation and follow complex legal
procedures in order to recognize the intended parents as the legal parents. Id. at 1524-25; see also David
Dodge, Legal Basics for L.G.B.T.Q. Parents, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
article/legal-basics-for-lgbtq-parents.html [https://perma.cc/C8AX-AVLA] (reporting that legal fees
associated with surrogacy can cost “thousands of dollars”).
17. Feinberg, supra note 10, at 1510-11.
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parentage” and will be forced to navigate the adoptive process to establish legal
parenthood.18
In an attempt to circumvent these economic and legal barriers to domestic ART
services, many LGBTQIA parents turn to international alternatives. This may be
because many countries have “more relaxed laws,” are “completely unregulated,” 19
or offer substantially cheaper services.20 Alternatively, some couples may be seeking
to grow their families while they are temporarily living abroad. Or, perhaps a close
friend, who lives in another country, has volunteered to be the gestational carrier.
Regardless of the couple’s particular reasons for choosing to utilize international
ART services, their choice does not circumvent all legal hurdles, and they may
actually face greater ones.
For example, cisgender same-sex male couples, in particular, may face
immigration battles when they return to the United States with their child. Married
cisgender same-sex male couples have had their child’s United States citizenship
from birth applications denied after using international ART services. 21 Despite
having indisputable evidence that the couple are the sole legal parents of their child,
the United States Department of State (State Department) has failed to consider the
child to be the marital child of both parents. Instead, because of a State Department
policy that required both parents to be biologically related to their child—which is
currently impossible for cisgender same-sex male couples—the State Department
refused to recognize the child’s citizenship from birth.22 As a result, families across
the country have had to face a stress that they could not have imagined: a mixedstatus family, where the parents are United States citizens, but their child is not.
This Comment addresses the inadequate relief granted by courts after the State
Department denied citizenship from birth to the children of married cisgender samesex male parents. This Comment also argues that the families’ constitutional claims
need to be addressed on the merits in order to prevent future discriminatory action.
In Section I, this Comment first outlines three cases from the Districts of Maryland,
Georgia, and California. This Section also provides the relevant statutory provisions,

18. Id. at 1511.
19. Claire Fenton-Glynn, Surrogacy: Why the World Needs Rules for ‘Selling’ Babies, BBC NEWS
(Apr. 26, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/health-47826356 [https://perma.cc/XFR7-RVVV] (“If their
own country does not allow surrogacy, or places restrictions on it, prospective parents can simply travel
to somewhere with more relaxed laws, or more problematically, a country where the practice is completely
unregulated.”).
20. Surrogacy in India is regularly quoted as costing $30,000. Darlena Cunha, The Hidden Cost of
International Surrogacy, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 22, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/
2014/12/the-hidden-costs-of-international-surrogacy/382757/ [https://perma.cc/CA9Y-ZP3P].
21. Kiviti v. Pompeo, 467 F. Supp. 3d 293, 298 (D. Md. 2020); Mize v. Pompeo, 482 F. Supp. 3d
1317, 1327 (N.D. Ga. 2020); Dvash-Banks v. Pompeo, No. 18-523, 2019 WL 911799, at *2 (C.D. Cal.
Feb. 21, 2019), aff’d sub nom. E. J. D.-B v. United States Dep’t of State, 825 F. App’x 479 (9th Cir. 2020).
22. The Biden Administration has since implemented a policy that recognizes both men in a cisgender
same-sex marriage as parents of a child born through international ART services. Press Statement, Ned
Price, Dep’t Spokesperson, U.S. Dep’t of State, U.S. Citizenship Transmission and Assisted Reproductive
Technology (May 18, 2021), https://www.state.gov/u-s-citizenship-transmission-and-assisted-reproduc
tive-technology/ [https://perma.cc/DC6R-NK3F]. However, this relief is inadequate because subsequent
administrations could simply revoke the administrative policy. Thus, as this Comment argues, additional
protection for cisgender same-sex married men is necessary.
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as well as the State Department policy that resulted in these three lawsuits. Section
II of this Comment provides an overview of the constitutional protections that have
been recognized for LGBTQIA individuals, including the right to marry. This
section also discusses Bostock v. Clayton County and argues that its broad-sweeping
and compelling reasoning ought to provide further constitutional protections for
LGBTQIA individuals under the Equal Protection Clause. Finally, in Section III,
this Comment proposes how courts might address these three cases if they were to
be adjudicated on the merits and argues that such an analysis is needed to best protect
cisgender same-sex male parents who choose to utilize international ART services
to grow their families.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Cases
Between 2018 and 2019, three families filed actions in federal district courts
across the country after each of their children—who were all conceived via
international ART services—were denied passports by the State Department. All of
the parents were United States citizens and had strong ties to the United States. The
State Department, effectuating an administrative policy,23 refused to issue the
passports to all three children because the children did not share a biological tie with
both of their legal parents. However, because all three families were headed by
cisgender same-sex male parents, they could not have both been the biological
parents of the children even if they had wanted to be. Despite the parents’ lawful
marriages, the State Department refused to acknowledge the children as the couples’
marital children. As addressed later in this Comment, not only does the relevant
statutory provision not require a biological relationship between the child and both
parents, but the State Department’s policy violates constitutional protections
afforded to same-sex married parents. The following subsections share each family’s
story, in turn.
1. The Kiviti Family
Like many married couples, the Kiviti’s relationship developed with the hope
and understanding that their family would eventually include children.24 Roee Kiviti,
a United States citizen, was born in Israel and moved to the United States in 1982, at
the age of four.25 In 2009, after living in the United States as a citizen for nine years,
Roee moved back to Israel for work, where he met and fell in love with Adiel, a thenIsraeli citizen.26 Adiel and Roee eventually married in Santa Barbara, California,
and they both ultimately moved to the United States.27 Eventually, Adiel became
23. This policy has since been amended by the Biden Administration. Infra notes 209-10 and
accompanying text.
24. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgement and in Opposition
to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 4, Kiviti v. Pompeo, 467 F. Supp. 3d 293 (D. Md. 2020) (No. TDC19-2665) [hereinafter Memo in Support of Kiviti].
25. Kiviti, 467 F. Supp. 3d at 297.
26. Id.
27. See id. The Kivitis were married in 2013. Id.
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naturalized as a United States citizen.28 After they moved back to the United States,
but before Adiel was naturalized as a citizen, Roee and Adiel made the decision to
begin to grow their family, utilizing international ART services. 29
The Kivitis used a Canadian volunteer gestational surrogate, a donor egg, and
Roee’s genetic material, and, in 2016, Roee and Adiel became the proud parents of
L.R.K.30 After L.R.K. was born in Canada, the Kivitis received a Canadian court
order that found Roee and L.R.K. shared a biological and genetic relationship, and
ordered that L.R.K.’s sole parents were Roee and Adiel. 31 The surrogate was
explicitly found to not be a parent of L.R.K.32 After being issued a Canadian birth
certificate, which identified the Kivitis as L.R.K.’s only parents, the Kivitis returned
to the United States and sought recognition of L.R.K.’s citizenship from birth.33 The
family applied for L.R.K.’s United States passport with the State Department. 34
Without any further inquiry, the State Department issued L.R.K. his passport in
January 2017.35
Two years later, hoping to give their son a younger sibling, Roee and Adiel
decided to grow their family through an identical reproductive plan. 36 This time,
however, Adiel—who had been naturalized as a United States citizen—donated his
genetic material.37 K.R.K. was born in Canada in 2019.38 Soon thereafter, a
Canadian court found that Adiel and K.R.K. shared a genetic and biological
relationship, and ordered that Roee and Adiel were K.R.K.’s only parents.39 The
surrogate was explicitly found to not be a parent of K.R.K. 40 The Kivitis
subsequently received a Canadian birth certificate that identified Roee and Adiel as
K.R.K.’s only parents.41 The family then applied for K.R.K.’s passport with the State
Department.42 However, K.R.K., born only two years after L.R.K., did not share the
same result as her brother.
Although the State Department told the Kivitis that they could pick up K.R.K.’s
passport in a few days, a State Department employee also wrote “surrogacy” on their
application.43 Moreover, unlike the passport application process with L.R.K., the
State Department called the Kivitis the next day and began inquiring about the
Kivitis’ surrogacy arrangement.44 On July 3, 2019, the State Department informed
the Kivitis that K.R.K. had been denied a passport because the State Department did

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Memo in Support of Kiviti, supra note 24, at 4.
Kiviti, 467 F. Supp. 3d at 297-98.
Id. at 298.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. The State Department never investigated the circumstances of L.R.K.’s conception. Id.
Memo in Support of Kiviti, supra note 24, at 4.
Kiviti, 467 F. Supp. 3d at 297, 298.
Memo in Support of Kiviti, supra note 24, at 5.
Kiviti, 467 F. Supp. 3d at 298.
Id.
Id.
Id.; Memo in Support of Kiviti, supra note 24, at 14.
Memo in Support of Kiviti, supra note 24, at 14.
Kiviti, 467 F. Supp. 3d at 298.
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not find her to be a citizen from birth.45 The State Department had applied the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) “born out of wedlock” statute,46
notwithstanding Adiel and Roee’s six-year marriage. Applying that provision, the
State Department reasoned that, because K.R.K. was conceived using Adiel’s genetic
material, K.R.K. could only derive citizenship from birth from Adiel.47 However,
Adiel had only resided within the United States as a citizen for approximately four
months,48 and he did not meet the five-year residency requirements prescribed by the
“born out of wedlock” statute.49 Because the State Department concluded that
K.R.K. was not a citizen from birth,50 the Kiviti Family was comprised of three
United States citizens and K.R.K., a foreign national.
The Kivitis sued the State Department in the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland, raising four claims:51 (1) the State Department’s basis for
denying K.R.K.’s passport was contrary to the text of the INA; 52 (2) the State
Department had impermissibly infringed on their Fifth Amendment substantive due
process right “to marry, procreate, and raise their children, and of K.R.K. to obtain
United States citizenship at birth;”53 (3) the State Department’s actions
“discriminated against the Kivitis as a same-sex couple and against K.R.K. based on
the circumstances of her birth and parentage,” which violated the equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment;54 and (4) the State Department’s actions
violated the Administrative Procedure Act.55 The Kivitis petitioned the court to issue
a declaratory judgment that K.R.K. is a citizen from birth, order that the State
Department issue K.R.K. a passport, declare that the State Department’s policies
requiring a biological relationship are unconstitutional and violate the INA, and issue
a permanent injunction against the State Department to discontinue their
discriminatory treatment.56

45. Memo in Support of Kiviti, supra note 24, at 15.
46. Kiviti, 467 F. Supp. 3d at 298.
47. See id. (explaining that because “Roee Kiviti did not have a biological relationship with
K.R.K . . . . the State Department evaluated K.R.K.’s passport application under [the born out of wedlock
statute]” in reference only to Adiel as the biological father).
48. See id. at 297, 298 (Adiel was naturalized on January 8, 2019, and the family applied for K.R.K.’s
citizenship on May 1, 2019).
49. See id. at 298.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 298-99.
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2. The Mize and Gregg Family
James “Derek” Mize was born in Jackson, Mississippi in 1980.57 After attending
law school in Ohio, Derek moved to New York City, where he met Jonathan Gregg.58
Jonathan was a United States citizen who had grown up in London, but had visited
the United States frequently throughout his life.59 After several months of their longdistance relationship, Jonathan transferred his work from England to his employer’s
New York offices.60 Similar to the Kivitis, Jonathan and Derek hoped and
understood that their future together would include children.61 The two were married
in May 2015, in New York City.62
Jonathan and Derek, ready to grow their family, accepted their close friend’s
offer to be their gestational surrogate.63 Their U.K.-based surrogate underwent an
ART procedure in October 2017, and S.M.-G. was born the next summer.64 Jonathan
and Derek were present in the delivery room, cut the umbilical cord, and held their
daughter.65 After the family spent three days in the hospital with their surrogate,
Jonathan and Derek finally left with S.M.-G.66 On March 21, 2019, a U.K. court
issued a parental order declaring that Jonathan and Derek were, under the law, the
parents of S.M.-G, and they were issued a new birth certificate that identified
Jonathan and Derek as the only parents of S.M.-G.67 However, upon returning to the
United States and applying for S.M.-G.’s social security number, they were told that
“additional evidence of S.M.-G.’s citizenship was required” and that they should
return to London.68
Once back in London, the family applied for S.M.-G.’s United States passport
at the London-based United States Embassy, providing proof of Jonathan and
Derek’s United States citizenship and their marriage certificate. 69 When asked who
S.M.-G.’s father was, the two responded that they both were.70 The staff person next
asked which of the men’s sperm had been used to conceive S.M.-G., forcing the two
parents to describe the ART process.71 Then, after waiting for three hours, the
embassy staff relayed that S.M.-G.’s application was denied.72 They were provided

57. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 4, Mize v. Pompeo,
482 F. Supp. 3d 1317 (N.D. Ga. 2020) [hereinafter Memo in Support of Mize]. This article refers to James
“Derek” Mize as Derek because the organization representing this family refers to him by his middle
name. See, e.g., Mize v. Pompeo, LAMBDA LEGAL, https://www.lambdalegal.org/in-court/cases/mize-vpompeo [https://perma.cc/C4BU-3LCD] (last visited Dec. 23, 2021).
58. See id. at 4-5.
59. Id. at 5. James was born in 1981 to a U.S.-citizen mother and a U.K.-citizen father. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 6.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 7.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 8.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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both a verbal notice, which dictated that S.M.-G. did not qualify for citizenship from
birth, and a written statement, which clearly demonstrated that the embassy had
treated them similarly to the Kivitis and refused to recognize that S.M.-G. was the
marital child of both Derek and Jonathan.73 Even more shockingly, the embassy
concluded that S.M.-G. was not Derek’s daughter at all.74 Blatantly ignoring their
marriage, the embassy determined that Derek’s parental relationship with his
daughter was irrelevant—simply because he did not share a biological relationship
with her.75 The embassy denied S.M.-G.’s application because Jonathan, although a
long-time United States citizen, had not resided within the United States for the fiveyear duration prescribed by the INA.76 The two parents left the embassy in pain, and
with feelings of humiliation.77
Derek Mize and Jonathan Gregg brought a lawsuit against the State Department,
which alleged nearly identical claims and sought nearly identical relief as the
Kivitis.78
3. The Dvash-Banks Family
Andrew Dvash-Banks was born in the United States, is a United States citizen,
and continuously resided in the United States from 1981 to 2005.79 Andrew met and
fell in love with his husband, Elad Dvash-Banks, while enrolled in a master’s degree
program in Israel.80 Elad and Andrew eventually moved to Canada and were married
in Toronto in 2010.81 The Dvash-Bankses also decided to grow their family through
international ART services.82 In 2015, the two men entered into a contract with a
gestational surrogate who agreed to carry and deliver two embryos.83 Andrew’s
genetic material was used to fertilize one of the embryos, and Elad’s was used to
fertilize the other.84 The twin boys, E.J. and A.J., were delivered in Ontario, Canada,
four minutes apart, in September 2016.85
In that same month, an Ontario court declared that Elad and Andrew were the
only legal parents of the twin boys.86 Four months later, the Dvash-Bankses applied
for a United States passport for E.J. and A.J. at the United States Consulate Office
in Toronto (the Consulate), providing evidence of the twins’ United States
citizenship.87 In their applications, the parents disclosed that the twins were
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 9.
76. Id.
77. See id.
78. Compare Mize v. Pompeo, 482 F. Supp. 3d 1317, 1327 (N.D. Ga. 2020) with Kiviti v. Pompeo,
467 F. Supp. 3d 293, 298-99 (D. Md. 2020).
79. Dvash-Banks v. Pompeo, No. 18-523, 2019 WL 911799, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2019), aff’d
sub nom. E. J. D.-B v. United States Dep’t of State, 825 F. App’x 479 (9th Cir. 2020).
80. See id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at *2.
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conceived using ART, and provided documentation that Elad and Andrew were the
twins’ fathers, evidence of Andrew’s United States citizenship and residency history,
and their marriage certificate.88 Despite all this evidence, they were told during their
interview that, unless there was a biological relationship between the twins and
Andrew, neither twin would qualify for United States citizenship from birth. 89
Moreover, in order to proceed in their applications, the Consulate required that
Andrew and Elad provide additional evidence of Andrew’s biological relationship to
each of the twins.90 Thus, Elad and Andrew had DNA tests arranged and submitted
the results back to the State Department.91
The DNA results established that A.J. was the biological child of Andrew, and
that E.J. was the biological child of Elad.92 The Consulate processed A.J.’s passport
application, but denied E.J.’s.93 The basis for the denial was “the lack of evidence
of a biological connection between Andrew and E.J.”94 Thus, the Consulate refused
to recognize that the twins were the marital children of both Elad and Andrew. 95
Rather, through applying the State Department’s policy, the Consulate only
recognized that Andrew was the father of A.J. and that Elad was the father of E.J.,
but refused to recognize that both men were the fathers of both twins.96 In doing so,
the Consulate disregarded the marital status of Elad and Andrew. Had the Consulate
recognized A.J. and E.J. as the Dvash-Bankses’ marital children, the twins would
have both been citizens from birth through Andrew.97 Instead, Andrew and Elad
were the proud parents of twin boys, but only one of the twins was a United States
citizen.98 Andrew Dvash-Bank filed a lawsuit against the State Department, alleging
nearly identical claims to the Kivitis, and Mize and Gregg Families, and sought
nearly identical relief.99
To better address how each of the district courts decided all three families’
claims, the subsequent two subsections of this Comment will provide necessary
background of the INA provisions at issue, as well as the State Department policy
that, when applied, has resulted in the disparate treatment of married cisgender samesex male parents.

88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. Id.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See Lena K. Bruce, How to Explain to Your Twins Why Only One Can be American: The Right to
Citizenship of Children Born to Same-Sex Couples Through Assisted Reproductive Technology, 88
FORDHAM L. REV. 999, 1002 (2019).
99. Compare Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, Dvash-Banks v. Pompeo, No. 18-523,
2019 WL 911799 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2019), aff’d sub nom. E. J. D.-B v. United States Dep’t of State, 825
F. App’x 479 (9th Cir. 2020), with Kiviti v. Pompeo, 467 F. Supp. 3d 293, 298 (D. Md. 2020), and Memo
in Support of Mize, supra note 57, at 1327. See also supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
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B. The Immigration and Nationality Act: Citizenship from Birth
The United States Constitution “contemplates two sources of citizenship, and
two only, —birth and naturalization.”100 Citizenship by naturalization101 is dictated
by the INA.102 On the other hand, citizenship by birth, pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment,103 is automatically established when an individual is merely born
within the United States.104 Thus, if a child is born outside of the United States,
having parents who are United States citizens does not constitutionally guarantee
their citizenship from birth.105 Rather, citizenship by birth for children born abroad
is derived if the parents can establish that they meet the requirements within the
INA.106 To this end, Congress has enacted sections 301 and 309 of the INA, which
codify the requirements that the parents must meet in order for the child to derive
citizenship from birth.107
1. Section 301 of the INA. Children Born in Wedlock
Section 301 of the INA provides the circumstances in which citizenship is
granted to children who are “born of . . . parents,” who are in wedlock, outside of the
United States.108 Specifically, section 301 applies if a child is born abroad to parents
who were married at the time the child was born, and at least one of the parents is a
United States citizen.109 If section 301 is applicable, then the statute places residency
requirements on the United States citizen parent, which must be satisfied for the child
to be a citizen from birth.110 The length of the residency requirement depends upon
which of the three statutory categories the parents are classified: 111 (1) both parents
are United States citizens;112 (2) one parent is a United States citizen and the other is
a noncitizen United States national;113 or (3) one parent is a United States citizen and

100. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 702 (1898).
101. Naturalization, as used in this Comment, refers to the process in which the United States confers
citizenship upon a person after birth through various provisions in the INA. See Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) § 101(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(23).
102. See Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 702; INA §§ 101-507, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537.
103. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”).
104. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 702.
105. See id. at 702-03.
106. See id.
107. See generally INA §§ 301, 309, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1409.
108. See id. § 301(c)-(e), (g), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c)-(e), (g).
109. See id.; 8 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 304.1-2(a), https://fam.state.gov/
FAM/08FAM/08FAM030401.html [https://perma.cc/N2KF-855U].
110. INA § 301(c)-(d), (g), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c)-(d), (g).
111. Bruce, supra note 98, at 1007.
112. INA § 301(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c).
113. Id. § 301(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(d). A United States National is “a citizen of the United States, or
[] a person who, though not a citizen of the United States, owes permanent allegiance to the United States.”
Id. § 101(a)(22), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22). A United States national typically, though not exclusively, refers
to a lawful permanent resident. See id. § 101(a)(21), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(21); 8 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 304.1-1(b)(1), https://fam.state.gov/FAM/08FAM/08FAM030101.html
[https://perma.cc/UM3P-N459] (“While most people and countries use the terms ‘citizenship’ and
‘nationality’ interchangeably, U.S. law differentiates between the two. Under current law all U.S. citizens
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the other is neither a citizen, nor a United States national. 114 Each category is
provided different residency requirements, which the parents must have satisfied
prior to the child’s birth.115
Section 301’s residency requirements decrease as the married couple’s ties to
the United States increase.116 For example, the third category has the most stringent
requirements, and citizenship is only derived at birth if the United States citizen
parent has been “physically present in the United States,” while holding citizenship
status, for at least five years. 117 In contrast, the first category merely requires that
one of the United States citizen parents resided in the United States, while holding
citizenship status, at any time before their child is born.118 The second category
provides a middle ground, requiring that the United States citizen parent reside in the
United States, while holding citizenship status, for one year prior to the child’s
birth.119
Thus, the threshold question in determining when to apply section 301 of the
INA is whether the child is “born of . . . parents” who are married at the time of the
child’s birth. For a cisgender opposite-sex couple, this threshold question is typically
met through the child’s father being married to the child’s mother at the time of the
child’s birth. However, because neither spouse within a cisgender same-sex male
marriage can biologically give birth to a child, this threshold question needs to be
satisfied by an alternative means. As argued throughout this Comment, such an
alternative ought to involve applying a marital presumption of paternity to the parent
who did not donate biological material to conceive the child but is married to the
parent that did.
For example, if it is presumed, because of their marital status, that Adiel and
Roee are both the parents of K.R.K., then section 301 should apply. This is because
K.R.K.’s parents, were married at the time that K.R.K. was born, and K.R.K. was
born outside of the United States. Because the Kivitis, through a marital
presumption, satisfy the threshold question of section 301 of the INA, the analysis
would then turn to consider the immigration status of the parents. The Kivitis would
be classified within the first category (both parents are United States citizens)
because both Adiel and Roee were United States citizens at the time that K.R.K. was
born. Finally, looking to the residency requirements, because Roee had resided
within the United States as a citizen for at least nine years, and Adiel for three years
and five months, both fathers would easily surpass the residency requirement
associated with the first category (lived in the United States at any time before the
child’s birth). Therefore, if Adiel and Roee were both presumed to be the parents of
K.R.K., then K.R.K. is a citizen from birth pursuant to section 301 and should be
issued a passport.
are also U.S. nationals, but not all U.S. nationals are U.S. citizens. The term ‘national of the United
States,’ as defined by statute . . . includes all citizens of the United States, and other persons who owe
allegiance to the United States but who have not been granted the privilege of citizenship.”).
114. INA § 301(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g).
115. Id. § 301(c)-(d), (g), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c)-(d), (g).
116. Id.
117. Id. § 301(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g).
118. Id. § 301(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c).
119. Id. § 301(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(d).

114

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:1

The predecessor statutes to section 301 of the INA extend back to the early
twentieth-century.120 The Ninth Circuit held that the intent behind one of the
predecessor statutes was to “ensure that parents who transmitted their United States
citizenship were sufficiently imbued with American values to convey these ideals to
their children.”121 The Supreme Court echoed this reasoning when it concluded that
the residency requirements within the modern statute are evidence of the legislature’s
important recognition that “residence in this country [is] the talisman of dedicated
attachment.”122 Section 301 creates an inversely proportional relationship between
the residency requirements and the strength of the parent’s ties to the United States,
which are indicated by the parent’s immigration status: the more permanent the
parent’s immigration status, the shorter the residency requirement.
2. INA Section 309. Children Born Out of Wedlock
Section 309 of the INA provides the circumstances in which citizenship is
granted to children who are “born out of wedlock” to at least one United States
citizen parent while outside of the United States.123 Unlike section 301, section 309
categorizes the United States citizen parent(s) by “father” or “mother.” 124
Citizenship from birth is only derived from a United States citizen “father” if they
can meet all four criteria of section 309(a), including having a “blood
relationship.”125 Additionally, section 309 requires that “fathers” also satisfy section
301(g) (five-year residency requirement).126 For “mothers,” section 309(c) grants
citizenship if the “mother” merely was a United States national and had resided in
the United States for one continuous year prior to the child’s birth, 127 but does not
require them to meet the elements of section 309(a). However, after the enactment
of this provision, the Supreme Court held that “mothers” must also satisfy the five-

120. The statute, in its original form, was codified as section 1993 and later replaced by the Nationality
Act of 1940. Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of 8 U.S.C.A. §
1401(c)-(g), Providing for American Citizenship in Certain Circumstances of Child Born Outside United
States, or Found Within United States and of Unknown Parentage, and Predecessor Statutes, 175 A.L.R.
FED. 67, at I §2[a] (2002) (explaining that section 1993 was also amended by a 1934 act of Congress to
make the statute gender neutral).
121. Id. at III § 6 (citing Friend v. Reno, 172 F.3d 638 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1163
(2000), reh’g denied, 529 U.S. 1083 (2000)).
122. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1700 (2017) (quoting Rogers v. Bellei, 410 U.S.
815, 834 (1971)); see id. (citing Weedin v. Chin Bow, 274 U.S. 657, 665-66 (1927)) (“Congress ‘attached
more importance to actual residence in the United States as indicating a basis for citizenship than it did to
descent . . . . ‘[T]he heritable blood of citizenship was thus associated unmistakably with residence within
the country which was thus recognized as essential to full citizenship.’”).
123. INA § 309, 8 U.S.C. § 1409.
124. Id.
125. Id. § 309(a)-(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)-(b). Aside from meeting the requirements pursuant to section
301(g), a father must also be able to establish that (1) there is “a blood relationship” between them and
the child; (2) the father was a United States national when the child was born; (3) “the father . . . agreed
in writing to provide financial support for the [child] until the [child] reaches the age of 18 years;” and (4)
the child, while under the age of eighteen, “is legitimated under the law of the [child’s] residence or
domicile” and the father has “acknowledge[d] paternity” or “paternity . . . [has been] established by
adjudication of a competent court.” Id. § 309(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a).
126. Id. §§ 301(g), 309(b), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401(g), 1409(b).
127. Id. § 309(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c).
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year residency requirement of section 301(g) and held that section 309(c)’s different
residency prescription for “mothers” violated the Constitution. 128
Therefore, if a couple is unable to satisfy the threshold question of section 301
of the INA, then section 309 is applied. A married cisgender same-sex male couple
might fail to satisfy the threshold question of section 301 if, for example, the
definition of “parent,” within the meaning of the INA, required a biological
relationship, and did not recognize a marital presumption. This was exactly what
happened to the Kivitis. The State Department refused to recognize both parents as
the parents of their children because one of them lacked a biological relationship
with their child.129 Therefore, the State Department applied section 309 instead of
section 301.
Likewise, because of the State Department’s biological-parent definition, which
could only be applied between Adiel and K.R.K., the State Department only
considered whether Adiel met the standards of section 309 of the INA.130 Therefore,
in order for K.R.K. to derive citizenship from birth, Adiel would need to satisfy the
requirements of section 309(a) and the residency requirements of section 301(g). 131
Adiel, who had resided in the United States as a citizen for three and a half years,
would fail to satisfy the five-year residency requirement of section 301(g), and
K.R.K. would not be a citizen from birth.132 As demonstrated by this example,
whether a parent is analyzed under section 309 or section 301 may have a direct
impact on the immigration status of their family, especially if the biological parent
is unable to meet the stringent residency requirements of section 301(g).
Some have argued that sections 301 and 309 of the INA essentially adopt the
aforementioned common-law presumption that children born in wedlock are the
legitimate children of the mother and the mother’s spouse, regardless of whether the
spouse is the biological parent of the child.133 In this light, section 309 might be most
reasonably justified through the purpose of the INA itself: “a liberal treatment of
children and . . . keeping families of United States citizens and immigrants
united.”134 Taking the INA’s overarching purpose and balancing it against the aims
underlying section 301’s residency requirements, Congress may have found a middle
ground in section 309 by requiring “fathers” to meet the five-year residency
requirement of section 301(g). This balancing also provides justification for why
section 309(a)(1) requires that there be a blood relationship for fathers and not

128. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1701 (2017) (holding that applying the five-year
residency requirement exclusively to “fathers” was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause and, in order
to make the provision constitutional while still complying with the legislative intent, the five-year
residency requirement pursuant to section 301(g) should also extend to “mothers”). See also Bruce, supra
note 98, at 1008.
129. Kiviti v. Pompeo, 467 F. Supp. 3d 293, 298 (D. Md. 2020).
130. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., Ashley D. Craythorne, Same-Sex Equality in Immigration Law: The Case for Birthright
Citizenship for Foreign-Born Children of U.S. Citizens in Same-Sex Binational Unions, 97 TEX. L. REV.
645, 652-53 (2019).
134. H.R. REP. NO. 85-1199, at *2020 (1957); see also Craythorne, supra note 133, at 652-53 (“Federal
courts have repeatedly looked to Congress’s legislative intent in interpreting the INA and construed its
statutes liberally to preserve the family unit.”).
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mothers: rather than trying to tie citizenship to a blood-right, Congress sought to
assure that the connection between the child and the father was sufficient. 135
Although the INA thoroughly details how a parent can transmit citizenship to
their child, it is ironically silent on what constitutes a sufficient parent-child
relationship to actually transmit citizenship,136 and no holding has answered this
question on a national level.137 How the parent-child relationship is defined for INA
sections 301 and 309 is critical, especially when parents utilize international ART
services. This is because citizenship can hinge on whether the parent-child
relationship exists between the United States citizen and the child.138 In fact, all three
cases addressed in this Comment turn on how this relationship is defined. As
explained above, if the parent-child relationship is defined in a way that presumed
Adiel and Roee—because of their marital status—were both the parents of K.R.K.,
then K.R.K. would have been a citizen from birth under section 301 of the INA. On
the other hand, if the parent-child relationship is defined to only recognize biological
parents, then a family headed by a married cisgender same-sex male couple will
always be subjected to analysis under section 309. This is because, under section
309, for a cisgender same-sex male couple, both parents cannot be the biological
parent of their child.
The State Department, through an administrative policy, has defined parentchild relationships as only those that consist of a biological tie, 139 and this definition
is precisely what led to the State Department denying K.R.K., S.M.-G., and E.J. their
passports.140 Under the State Department’s section 309 analysis, if the biological
parent is unable to satisfy the five-year residency requirement—like Adiel, Jonathan,
and Elad—their child will be denied citizenship from birth.141

135. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 66-67 (2001). Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that
the blood relationship requirement of section 309(a) assures that the father knows of the child and has
developed a relationship with the child. Id.
136. The INA does not define the parent-child relationship with any of the applicable sections. Bruce,
supra note 98, at 1008; see also Scott Titshaw, A Modest Proposal to Deport the Children of Gay Citizens,
& Etc.: Immigration Law, the Defense of Marriage Act and the Children of Same-Sex Couples, 25 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 407, 420 (2011). While the INA defines “parent” and “child” separately, the definitions are
not useful in interpreting INA sections 301 or 309. Bruce, supra note 98, at 1008-09.
137. But see Scales v. INS, 232 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that “[t]here is no requirement
of a blood relationship” under section 301); Jaen v. Sessions, 899 F.3d 182, 186 (2d Cir. 2018) (holding
that section 301’s statutory language “born . . . of parents both of whom are citizens of the United States”
only pertains to the child’s acquisition of citizenship from birth).
138. Bruce, supra note 98, at 1008-09; see also 8 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL §
304.1-2, https://fam.state.gov/fam/08fam/08fam030401.html [https://perma.cc/N2KF-855U].
139. 8 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 304.1-2(a)(2), https://fam.state.gov/fam/
08fam/08fam030401.html [https://perma.cc/N2KF-855U] (“To say a child was born ‘in wedlock’ means
that the child’s biological parents were married to each other at the time of the child’s birth . . . .”). This
policy has since been amended by the Biden Administration. See infra notes 209-10 and accompanying
text.
140. Memo in Support of Kiviti, supra note 24, at 6.
141. See, e.g., Kiviti v. Pompeo, 467 F. Supp. 3d 293, 298 (D. Md. 2020); Memo in Support of Mize,
supra note 57, at 9; Dvash-Banks v. Pompeo, No. 18-523, 2019 WL 911799, at *1-2 (C.D. Cal. Feb 21,
2019), aff’d sub nom. E. J. D.-B v. United States Dep’t of State, 825 F. App’x 479 (9th Cir. 2020); see
also 8 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 304.1-2, https://fam.state.gov/fam/08fam/
08fam030401.html [https://perma.cc/N2KF-855U].
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C. The Foreign Affairs Manual
The Secretary of State is statutorily provided the authority to administer the INA
regarding “the determination of nationality of a person not in the United States.” 142
A passport issued by the Secretary of State’s proper authority has “the same force
and effect as proof of . . . citizenship issued by the Attorney General or by a court
having naturalization jurisdiction.”143 The Foreign Affairs Manual (the FAM),
issued by the Secretary of State, provides “written guidance for [State Department]
officials adjudicating passport applications” and governs the operations of the State
Department.144 Through the FAM, the State Department has further defined the
parent-child relationship and has provided guidance for consular officers on how to
determine whether section 301 (born in wedlock) or section 309 (born out of
wedlock) should apply.145
In order for a consular officer to apply section 301 of the INA, the FAM requires
that “there be a biological relationship between the [United States] citizen parent
and the child”146 and that “the child’s biological parents were married to each other
at the time of the child’s birth.”147 In other words, for section 301 to apply, the FAM
requires that the child be biologically related to both parents, and the biological
parents must have been married when the child was born. Therefore, if both parents
are not biologically related to their child—which is always the case for cisgender
same-sex male couples—the State Department will consider the child born out of
wedlock, notwithstanding the parent’s marital status, and apply section 309 of the
INA instead.
Moreover, the FAM states that if a consular officer doubts that “the citizen
putative ‘parent’ is biologically related to the child” then “[they] must investigate
carefully.”148 Careful investigation might be triggered, for example, if a cisgender
same-sex male couple were to appear before the State Department seeking a passport
for their child. Cisgender same-sex male couples cannot possibly both be related to
the child by blood, so an officer is more likely to investigate the circumstances of

142. INA § 104(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1104(a).
143. 22 U.S.C. § 2705.
144. Kiviti, 467 F. Supp. 3d at 302; see 8 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL §§ 301.11 to 101.2-1, https://fam.state.gov/Fam/FAM.aspx?ID=08FAM [https://perma.cc/UQ3P-2V5K].
145. Kiviti, 467 F. Supp. 3d at 302; see 8 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL §§ 304.1,
304.2, https://fam.state.gov/fam/08fam/08fam030401.html [https://perma.cc/N2KF-855U].
146. 8 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 304.2-1(b), https://fam.state.gov/fam/
08fam/08fam030402.html [https://perma.cc/6TZ4-GJVK]. The FAM provides discretion to the passport
agency, embassies, and consulates to “[a]ssess whether a claimant has provided sufficient evidence to
establish a derivative claim to U.S. citizenship . . . through review of documentary evidence provided by
the claimant.” Id. If any doubt arises regarding a biological relationship between the parent and child,
the consular officer is “expected to investigate carefully.” Id.
147. 8 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 304.1-2(a)(2), https://fam.state.gov/fam/
08fam/08fam030401.html [https://perma.cc/N2KF-855U] (emphasis added).
148. Id. § 304.1-1(d). This provision provides three examples of when circumstances may raise doubt
that the child is not born to “biological parents.” Id. Specifically, a consular officer is encouraged to
investigate if a child is conceived or born “when either of the alleged biological parents [were not]
married,” when names on a birth certificate as the “father and/or mother” are different from the names of
“the alleged biological parents,” or if there is “[e]vidence or indications that the child was conceived at a
time when the alleged father had no physical access to the mother.” Id.
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their child’s birth. In contrast, a cisgender opposite-sex couple may not be subjected
to the same careful investigation because the couple may not raise the officer’s
suspicions. Careful investigation might include questions about the couple’s
surrogacy arrangements, biological relationship to the child, citizenship status, and
residency history.
In this regard, the State Department’s policy categorically and disparately
affects married cisgender same-sex male parents who choose to participate in
international ART services.149 Under the FAM’s definition of the parent-child
relationship, the children of these parents will never be considered born in wedlock,
even when their legal parents are married long before they were born. Not only can
this directly impact the child’s immigration status, but it also marks the federal
government’s failure to treat same-sex and opposite-sex couples equally.
Prior scholarship has brought attention to the State Department’s erroneous
interpretation of section 301 of the INA, as well as the constitutional concerns that
the policy raises.150 Lena Bruce argues that biology-based parentage is incongruent
with the INA’s emphasis on “[f]amily unification” and that the State Department’s
policy relies on technicalities that are arbitrary and do not align with many states’
movements towards intent-based parental rights.151 Bruce correctly argues that
same-sex parent’s intentional use of ART to grow their families meets the aims of
section 301. Contrary to the State Department’s contentions otherwise, K.R.K.
should have been found to be a citizen from birth because she was the marital child
of Adiel and Roee. As the marital child of the Kivitis, the State Department should
have analyzed K.R.K.’s citizenship from birth under section 301. Instead, the State
Department only considered K.R.K.’s citizenship status under section 309, as it
applied to Adiel. The State Department reasoned that K.R.K. lacked a “biological
relationship to Roee” and, therefore, could only claim citizenship from birth through
her relationship with Adiel.152
Bruce’s conclusion is underscored by the constitutionally protected substantive
due process rights that have been extended to married same-sex couples.153 In
addition, the Supreme Court’s compelling and broad-sweeping reasoning in Bostock
v. Clayton County, although specific to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, suggests

149. See Bruce, supra note 98, at 1010 (“This means that, in same-sex relationships, at least one
intended parent will always lack a biological connection with the child and, as a result, never be legally
recognized as the parent of the child under the INA.”). Although the FAM creates a small exception by
defining a biological mother as “either the genetic mother or the gestational mother,” it only covers samesex parents in which one parent is able to provide an egg donation and the other is able to be the gestational
carrier. Id. at 1010-11 (emphasis in original); see also 8 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MANUAL § 304.4-1(D)(1)(c), https://fam.state.gov/fam/08fam/08fam030401.html [https://perma.cc/N2
KF-855U] (“A woman may have a biological relationship with her child through either a genetic parental
relationship or a gestational relationship. In other words, a woman may establish a biological relationship
with her child either by virtue of being the genetic mother (the woman whose egg was used in conception)
or the gestational mother (the woman who carried and delivered the baby).”).
150. See, e.g., id. at 1012-24.
151. See id. at 1016-20 (arguing that recent cases arising pursuant to the State Department’s policy
“exemplify how, in the age of ART, a biology-based definition of parentage leads to senseless citizenship
results”).
152. Memo in Support of Kiviti, supra note 24, at 6.
153. See infra Section II.
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that the Court may begin to recognize that discrimination based on sexual orientation
is a form of sex-based discrimination and subject to intermediate scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause.154 Although the Kivitis, Mize and Gregg, and Dvash-Banks
families asked the courts to recognize their families’ constitutional rights and
protections, each district court refused to evaluate their constitutional claims, instead
focusing on the plain language of the statute.
D. The Resulting Lawsuits and Constitutional Avoidance
Although all three families raised constitutional issues in their complaints, the
district courts failed to adjudicate those claims on the merits. The canon of
constitutional avoidance applies when “statutory language is susceptible of multiple
interpretations,” and one of the interpretations reasonably raises constitutional
doubts.155 If invoked, the canon allows the court to “shun [such] an interpretation”
and, instead, “adopt an alternative [interpretation] that avoids those problems.” 156
However, the alternative interpretation must be “plausible,” “fairly possible,” or
“reasonable.”157 Additionally, even if the court is to rely on the canon of
constitutional avoidance, it “still must interpret the statute, [and] not rewrite it.”158
Therefore, at its core, the canon of constitutional avoidance permits a court to adopt
an interpretation of an ambiguous statute in a way that would not raise constitutional
questions, and it allows the court to avoid a holding on the merits of the constitutional
claim.159
In the Kiviti’s case, the court reasoned that it did not need to invoke the canon
of constitutional avoidance because section 301 of the INA, based on its plain
language, does not require a biological relationship between both parents. 160 In the
Mize and Gregg family’s claim, the court also found that section 301 did not require
a blood relationship between both parents; however, the court hinged its reasoning
on the canon of constitutional avoidance.161 Finally, in the Dvash-Bankses’ claim,
the United States District Court for the Central District of California held that the
family’s constitutional claims were mooted after finding that the plain language of
section 301 does not require a biological relationship.162 Despite reaching a
favorable outcome for the plaintiffs in each case, failing to adjudicate the
constitutional claims on the merits enables the State Department to resume this
discriminatory practice. Further, this failure leaves an unacceptable ambiguity as to
which immigration benefits, if any, apply to married same-sex couples and their
children under the equal protection guarantees of the Due Process Clause.

154. See generally Andrew Koppelman, Headnote, Bostock, LGBT Discrimination, and the
Subtractive Moves, 105 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 1 (2020) (arguing that, despite the persuasive
reasoning in the dissents, the reasoning in Bostock should apply generally to LGBT-based discrimination).
155. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 836 (2018).
156. Id.
157. Mize v. Pompeo, 482 F. Supp. 3d 1317, 1333 (N.D. Ga. 2020) (citing Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 842).
158. Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 837 (emphasis in original).
159. See id. at 836.
160. Kiviti v. Pompeo, 467 F. Supp. 3d 293, 313 (D. Md. 2020).
161. Mize, 482 F. Supp. 3d at 1335-42.
162. Dvash-Banks v. Pompeo, No. 18-523, 2019 WL 911799, at **7-8 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2019), aff’d
sub nom. E. J. D.-B v. United States Dep’t of State, 825 F. App’x 479 (9th Cir. 2020).
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1. Kiviti v. Pompeo
The Kivitis filed their lawsuits in the United States District Court for the District
of Maryland in September 2019. They asked the court to, inter alia, declare that the
State Department’s biological definition of the parent-child relationship is contrary
to the intent of the INA, and that the State Department’s policy violated their and
K.R.K.’s Fifth Amendment rights.163 However, after the State Department’s motion
for summary judgment, the court refused to invoke the canon of constitutional
avoidance, finding that, under the plain language of the statute, section 301 of the
INA does not require a biological tie between both parents and the child. 164
Therefore, the court did not need to reach the constitutional question. 165
The court recognized that, on its face, section 301 does not provide for a
biological requirement.166 Thus, the narrow issue before the court was whether the
statutory language “born . . . of parents” implies that section 301 requires “both
married parents [be] biologically related to [the] child.”167 After acknowledging that
both the Ninth and Second Circuits have held that section 301 of the INA does not
require a biological relationship,168 the court next turned to its own statutory
interpretation.169
The court first concluded that the term “parents” did not require a biological
tie.170 It reasoned that although the INA references “parents” and provides
contextual definitions in some provisions, no decisive definitions are found within
the same subchapter as sections 301 and 309 of the INA. 171 Therefore, the court
turned to the common law meaning of the word “parent,” found that the term refers
to relationships that do not have a biological tie, and recognized the common law
presumption of legitimacy, which presumes that a child born to a married couple is
the child of both spouses.172
The court also rejected the State Department’s contention that “the dictionary
definitions of ‘born’ and ‘of,’” when combined, create a meaning “that the child
‘originates or derives from those parents,’” which can only apply to biological
parents.173 The court first reasoned because Congress used “born of,” a judicially
created concept, Congress intended to invoke the judicially recognized meaning. 174
Additionally, the court reasoned that the term “born . . . of” inherently raises a range

163. Kiviti, 467 F. Supp. 3d at 298.
164. Id. at 311-13.
165. Id. at 313.
166. Id. at 304.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 304-05; see Scales v. INS, 232 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that “[t]here is no
requirement of a blood relationship” under section 301); Jaen v. Sessions, 899 F.3d 182, 189-90 (2d Cir.
2018) (holding that section 301’s statutory language “born . . . of parents both of whom are citizens of the
United States” does not require a blood relationship).
169. Kiviti, 467 F. Supp. 3d at 306.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 307.
174. See id. at 307-308 (citing Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. N.J. Dep’t Env’t Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 501
(1986)).
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of interpretations, some of which do not include a biological relationship, such as
couples who “play a fundamental and instrumental role in the creation of [a] child”
via ART.175
Next, the court compared the statutory scheme of section 301 with section 309
of the INA.176 Despite the State Department’s contentions to the contrary, the court
reasoned that the contrast between the two provisions only underscores its finding
that section 301 does not require a biological relationship.177 The court reasoned, in
part, that Congress would have included a blood relationship requirement in section
301 if it wanted to, and that Congress’s inclusion of a “blood relationship” in section
309 of the INA demonstrated that it knew how to do so.178
Finally, the court recognized that the State Department’s analysis of K.R.K.’s
citizenship from birth under section 309 led to a result that conflicted with the
language of that statute.179 This is because, under the State Department’s analysis,
if both Adiel and Roee are not considered the parents of K.R.K., then her parents
must be Adiel and either an anonymous egg donor or the gestational surrogate. 180
However, neither the egg donor nor the surrogate have any legal parent status. 181 It
follows that the State Department cannot strictly apply section 301(g), which is only
triggered when a child is born out of wedlock to one United States citizen parent and
one noncitizen parent, because K.R.K. would technically only have one parent. 182
Thus, section 309 cannot be strictly adhered to, nor reconciled with, the
circumstances of K.R.K.’s birth.183
Because the District Court concluded that section 301 does not require a blood
relationship, it follows that K.R.K. qualified for citizenship from birth because she
was born in wedlock to Adiel and Roee, both of whom had resided in the United
States before K.R.K.’s birth.184 Because the court was able to interpret section 301
of the INA based on its plain language, the court did not need to apply the canon of
constitutional avoidance.185 According to the Kiviti court, the statutory language was
not ambiguous and did not raise any interpretations that would possibly be
unconstitutional.186 Therefore, the court failed to address the Kivitis’ constitutional
claims on their merits and merely provided dicta to how the constitutional argument
might result.

175. Id. at 308.
176. Id.; see also supra Section I.B.
177. Kiviti, 467 F. Supp. 3d at 308.
178. Id. Likewise, Congress uses the term “natural parent” elsewhere in the INA but does not include
such a term in section 301. Id.
179. Id. at 309. The court also addressed some of the State Department’s arguments that fell outside
of the plain language of the INA. Id. at 309-12. This Comment does not address these arguments.
180. See id. at 310.
181. See id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See id. at 314.
185. Id. at 313.
186. Id. Nonetheless, the court provided an alternative argument that outlined the constitutional
protections and rights that have been recognized for married same-sex couples and their children. Id. at
313-14. The constitutional considerations raised by the court are addressed in Section II of this Comment.
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2. Mize v. Pompeo
Derek and Jonathan filed their lawsuit in the District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia in July 2019.187 Like the Kivitis, they requested that the court
declare that the State Department’s biological definition for the parent-child
relationship is contrary to the INA and that the State Department’s policy violated
their and S.M.-G.’s Fifth Amendment rights.188 However, unlike the Kiviti court, the
Mize court held that section 301 of the INA does not require that a biological
relationship exist between both parents and the child because of the canon of
constitutional avoidance.189
The court first identified Supreme Court precedent that ultimately requires that
the government give “married same-sex couples access to the constellation of
benefits that the State has linked to marriage,” and recognize that citizenship from
birth “could reasonably be viewed as a ‘benefit.’”190 Therefore, the court concluded
that the State Department’s definition of the parent-child relationship, which
disparately impacts the children of married cisgender same-sex male parents, could
reasonably raise serious doubts about section 301’s constitutionality. 191
Next, the court concluded that the ordinary meaning of the term “born . . . of
parents” within section 301 is “reasonably consistent” with both the biological and
non-biological readings.192 The court concluded that the word “of” indicates
“origin,” similar to how “born of” is a common way to describe ancestral descent.193
In the alternative, the court reasoned that the term could be read liberally because
“of” has lost its precision over time and may indicate an attenuated connection in
some instances.194 Therefore, the biological requirement may be “more weight . . .
than [“of”] can bear.”195 Moreover, under the broader meaning, the term could refer
to a child that “originate[s] from parents other than through a genetic relationship,
such as where two married parents both play a fundamental and instrumental role in
the creation of the child” via ART.196 Like the Kiviti court, the Mize court also
concluded that Congress would have included a blood relationship in section 301 if
it wanted one, and because “Congress does not ‘hide elephants in mouseholes,’” it is
unlikely that Congress would have used a “vague, two-letter preposition to implicitly
incorporate such a weighty [biological] requirement.”197
Because the biological and non-biological definitions both were “reasonably
consistent” with the language and construction of section 301, and the biological
definition “would raise serious constitutional questions,” the court concluded that the
canon of constitutional avoidance required that section 301 be interpreted to not

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Mize v. Pompeo, 482 F. Supp. 3d 1317, 1327 (N.D. Ga. 2020).
Compare id., with Kiviti, 467 F. Supp. 3d at 298.
Mize, 482 F. Supp. 3d at 1332.
Id. at 1334-35 (citing Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2078 (2017)).
Id. at 1335.
Id. at 1338.
Id. at 1336-37.
Id. at 1337.
Id.
Id. (quoting Kiviti v. Pompeo, 467 F. Supp. 3d 293, 308 (2020)).
Id. at 1339.
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require a biological tie between both parents and the child.198 Although the court
ordered that the State Department issue S.M.-G. a passport, the court’s use of the
canon of constitutional avoidance allowed it to circumvent addressing the
constitutional claims on the merits.
3. Dvash-Banks v. Pompeo
The Dvash-Bankses filed their lawsuit in the District Court for the Central
District of California in January 2018.199 The couple moved for summary judgment,
requesting that the court declare (1) that E.J. is a citizen from birth pursuant to
section 301 of the INA; and (2) declare that the State Department’s policy violated
their and S.M.-G.’s Fifth Amendment rights.200 In addressing the first claim, the
court relied heavily on Scales v. INS and Solis-Espinoza v. Gonzales, which
established Ninth Circuit precedent that section 301 “does not require a person born
during their parents’ marriage to demonstrate a biological relationship with both of
their married parents.”201 The court reasoned that the circumstances of E.J.’s birth,
aside from the gender of his parents, were indistinguishable from the facts in Scales
and Solis-Espinoza, and that those cases should control.202
Additionally, the Dvash-Banks court reasoned that by including a blood
relationship in section 309 of the INA, but not section 301, “Congress made it clear
that it intended children born in and out of wedlock to be treated differently for
purposes of acquiring [United States] citizenship.” 203 Moreover, such a finding is
consistent with the legislative history of the provision, which prioritizes keeping
families comprised of both citizens and noncitizens together and treating children
generously.204 Despite the court’s simple analysis in holding that E.J. was a citizen
from birth,205 the court failed to address the Dvash-Bankses’ constitutional claims on
the merits.206 Instead, the court dismissed their constitutional claims for mootness
after it held that E.J. was a citizen from birth because the statutory interpretation
favored the Dvash-Bankses’ first claim.207 Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the district court.208

198. Id. at 1342. The court also founded its reasoning on the State Department’s inability to foreclose
the non-biological definition as the only reasonably consistent interpretation. Id. at 1340-42.
199. Dvash-Banks v. Pompeo, No. 18-523, 2019 WL 911799, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2019), aff’d
sub nom. E. J. D.-B v. United States Dep’t of State, 825 F. App’x 479 (9th Cir. 2020).
200. Id.
201. Id. at *7 (citing Scales v. INS, 232 F.3d 1159, 1162 (9th Cir. 2000); Solis-Espinoza v. Gonzales,
401 F.3d 1090, 1093 (9th Cir. 2005)).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at *8.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at **8-9.
208. E. J. D.-B v. United States Dep’t of State, 825 F. App’x 479, 480 (9th Cir. 2020), aff’g DvashBanks v. Pompeo, No. 18-523, 2019 WL 911799 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2019).
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4. The Failures of Constitutional Avoidance
Despite each family obtaining a favorable outcome, it remains critical for the
federal courts to analyze all three families’ claims on the merits. First and foremost,
within the first five months of President Biden’s term, the State Department updated
its policy so that children born via international ART services to married cisgender
same-sex male couples are granted citizenship from birth.209 Although the State
Department updated its interpretation and application of section 301 of the INA, 210
this update remains an administrative policy that is subject to the political ebbs and
flows of the executive branch. In other words, administrative actions are
implemented unilaterally, and subsequent Presidents may undo this policy within the
first few months of their administration. Therefore, without federal courts also
reaching a conclusion on the merits, any State Department policy updates may only
provide relief that is limited in duration and dependent upon the political climate of
the moment.
Second, as a matter of jurisdictional authority, federal court precedent is only
controlling for the administrative agency offices that operate within its
jurisdiction.211 For example, the holding in the Kivitis’ case that section 301 does
not require that both parents have a biological relationship with their child is only
controlling for the government agency offices operating within the District of
Maryland. As a result, if the State Department’s policies were reverted to their preBiden Administration version, a married cisgender same-sex male couple who uses
international ART services and seeks a passport for their child outside of the Ninth
Circuit, Maryland, or Georgia, will likely face the same discriminatory treatment.
Therefore, it is crucial that the State Department’s disparate treatment of same-sex
parents is held to be constitutionally impermissible by the Supreme Court. Finally,
because Congress has been unable to pass comprehensive immigration reform since
1986,212 establishing long-lasting protections for future couples will likely be left to
the Supreme Court or piecemeal legislative amendments to the INA.
More importantly, Mize underscores that some courts may conclude that section
301 of the INA requires a biological tie. Although the cases mentioned in this
Comment reached the same outcome, such results are not guaranteed in future cases.
For example, although the Kiviti court was convinced that the plain language of

209. See Press Statement, Ned Price, Dep’t Spokesperson, U.S. Dep’t of State, U.S. Citizenship
Transmission and Assisted Reproductive Technology (May 18, 2021), https://www.state.gov/u-s-citizen
ship-transmission-and-assisted-reproductive-technology/ [https://perma.cc/DC6R-NK3F].
210. Id. (announcing the updated State Department policy to grant citizenship from birth to children
who are “born abroad to parents, at least one of whom is a U.S. Citizen and who are married to each other
at the time of birth . . . if [the children] have a genetic or gestational tie to at least one of their parents and
meet the INA’s other requirements . . . .”); see Sarah Zhang, The IVF Cases that Broke Birthright
Citizenship, THE ATLANTIC (June 10, 2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2021/06/ivfus-birthright-citizenship/619155/ [https://perma.cc/U8YT-5F7U].
211. NLRB v. Ashkenazy Prop. Mgmt. Corp., 817 F.2d 74, 75 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 501 U.S.
1217 (1991) (“Administrative agencies are not free to refuse to follow circuit precedent in cases
originating within the circuit . . . .”).
212. See Mariela Olivares, The 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act as Antecedent to
Contemporary Lantina/o/x Migration, 37 CHICANA/O-LATINA/O L. REV. 65, 70 (2020) (the IRCA was
passed by Congress in 1986).
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section 301 did not require a biological tie, the Mize court was willing to entertain
the notion that the term “born . . . of parents” could possibly be construed to require
that both parents and the child are biologically related. Therefore, it is plausible that
a district court in another state might go one step further than the Mize court and
conclude that Congress intended the term “born . . . of parents” to require a
biological tie. If this were the case, that court would likely deny the child citizenship
from birth and allow the State Department to continue its discriminatory application
of section 309 within its jurisdiction.
Furthermore, if lower courts fail to address the issue on the merits, the Supreme
Court may decide to only take up the narrow issue of whether the methods of
statutory interpretation or the cannon of constitutional avoidance were properly
applied. Likewise, courts that fail to address the constitutional issues on the merits
leave important questions unanswered: (1) whether citizenship status falls within the
constellation of benefits associated with marriage and is, therefore, protected under
the equal protection guarantees of the Due Process Clause; and (2) if citizenship from
birth is not a constitutionally protected benefit, whether discrimination based on an
individual’s sexual orientation, in light of Bostock v. Clayton County, is entitled to
closer scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS FOR SAME-SEX PARENTS
The Supreme Court of the United States, throughout the last three decades, has
gradually become more cognizant of the LGBTQIA community and the
discrimination that community faces. The Due Process Clause guarantees same-sex
couples the right to marry, as well as the same benefits given to opposite-sex couples
through marital status—including those associated with parental rights.213
Additionally, the Supreme Court, in Bostock v. Clayton County, has recently
accepted compelling and broad-sweeping reasoning that may classify LGBTQIA
discrimination as a form of sex-based discrimination.214 Such a classification, if
extended to the Equal Protection Clause, would raise the level of scrutiny currently
applied to same-sex couples from rational basis to intermediate scrutiny. Regardless
of whether Bostock might be extended, the Supreme Court should find that the State
Department’s analysis of families like the Kivitis, Mize and Gregg, and DvashBankses is constitutionally impermissible.
A. The Right to Marry and the Benefits that Follow
Over the last decade, the Supreme Court has continually recognized and
affirmed the existence of constitutional protections for LGBTQIA persons under the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. In the 1996 case Romer v. Evans, the
Court first recognized that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits a state from barring
legislative, executive, or judicial action aimed at protecting “gays and lesbians” as a

213. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 665-66 (2015).
214. See Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020).
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class.215 In that case, the Court reasoned that the Colorado amendment
impermissibly “harm[ed] a politically unpopular group” because it did not rationally
relate to “a legitimate governmental interest.”216 Thus, Romer recognized that “gays
and lesbians” should be afforded at least some protections as a class. 217 Moreover,
some Justices have argued that the standard of review applied in Romer was actually
“a more searching form of rational basis” for a law that “desired to harm a politically
unpopular group.”218
In Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court overruled Bowers v. Hardwick219 and
struck down a Texas anti-sodomy law220 because it was unconstitutional pursuant to
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.221 In
Bowers, the Court had upheld a Georgia anti-sodomy law that Hardwick had been
charged with after “committing [sodomy] with another adult male in the bedroom of
[Bowers’s] home.”222 The Bowers Court reasoned that granting “homosexual
conduct” privacy protections would create a slippery slope for protecting actions of
“adultery, incest, and other sexual crimes . . . committed in the home.”223 In its
decision to overturn Bowers, the Lawrence Court reasoned that, under the Due
Process Clause, a state may not demean or control gay individuals through
criminalizing their private sexual conduct, and a person’s right to liberty prevents
such government intervention.224 Thus, in Lawrence, the Court recognized, for the
first time, that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses recognize a “realm of
personal liberty” for LGBTQIA individuals.225
Ten years later, in United States v. Windsor, the Supreme Court struck down a
provision within the Defense of Marriage Act of 1996 (“DOMA”) 226 because it too
violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection
Clause.227 DOMA contained two separate provisions that targeted same-sex couples.
The first provision allowed States to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages
performed under the laws of other States.228 The second provision amended the
federal definition of “marriage” within the United States Code to exclude same-sex

215. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623-24 (1996). This article uses LGBTQIA to reference sexual
orientation, sexual identity, and gender identity, and only uses “gays and lesbians” here because of the
classification drawn by the Romer Court.
216. Id. at 634 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
217. Id.
218. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
219. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
220. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (West 2003) (“A person commits an offense if he engages in
deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex.”).
221. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79.
222. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188, 196.
223. Id. at 195-96.
224. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
225. See id. (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992)).
226. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1997), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
227. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 775.
228. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1997), invalidated by Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (“No
State . . . shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other
State . . . respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the
laws of such other State . . . or a right or claim arising from such relationship.”).
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marriages.229 As a result of the second provision, Edith Windsor, who had received
the entirety of her deceased wife’s estate, was not afforded the same tax benefits that
a cisgender opposite-sex couple would have been given.230 The Windsor Court
reasoned that DOMA “[restricts] and [restrains] . . . persons who are joined in samesex marriages made lawful by the State” and that the Act “instructs all federal
officials, and indeed all persons with whom same-sex couples interact, including
their own children, that their marriage is less worthy than the marriages of others.”231
Moreover, the Windsor Court concluded that the government had failed to assert a
“legitimate purpose [that] overc[ame] the purpose and effect to disparage and to
injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood
and dignity.”232 Though, because Windsor only raised the issue of the second
provision, the Court did not consider whether the right to marry was also
constitutionally guaranteed for same-sex couples.233
However, in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Court answered that remaining
question.234 In 2015, the Supreme Court held that the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee that “same-sex couples
may exercise the right to marry” in all states and that marriages of both opposite-sex
and same-sex couples must be “on the same terms and conditions.”235 The
Obergefell Court founded its reasoning on “four principles and traditions,” which
demonstrated why “marriage is fundamental under the Constitution” and why it must
“apply with equal force to same-sex couples.”236 In its first principle, the Court
analogized the right to marry with the personal choices of “contraception, family
relationships, procreation, and childrearing . . . which are [all] protected by the
Constitution.”237 The first principle recognized that the right to marry is “a personal
choice . . . inherent in the concept of individual autonomy.”238 In its second
principle, the Court reasoned that the right for same-sex couples to marry is
fundamental because “it supports a two-person union unlike any other in its
importance to the committed individuals.”239 The Court also recognized that samesex couples’ right to intimacy, as found in Lawrence, does not stop at prohibiting

229. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1997), invalidated by Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (“In determining the meaning of any
Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and
agencies of the United States, the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man and one
woman as husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a
husband or a wife.”).
230. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 749-751.
231. Id. at 775.
232. Id.
233. See Id. at 752.
234. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 675-76 (2015).
235. Id.
236. Id. at 665.
237. Id. at 666.
238. Id. at 665.
239. Id. at 666.
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criminalization, but extends into marriage, where same-sex couples can “achieve the
full promise of liberty.”240
Most importantly, the Court’s third principle focused on the “safeguards” that
the right to marry provides for “children and families,” and that the concept of
marriage is meaningfully related to “childrearing, procreation, and education.” 241
The Court went so far as to say that child rearing is so “central [a] premise” to the
right to marry that denying this right to same-sex couples conflicts with marriage as
a whole.242 Thus, the effect on the child was a significant factor for the Court, which
reasoned that “without the recognition, stability, and predictability marriage offers,
[same-sex couples’] children suffer the stigma of knowing their families are
somehow lesser . . . [which] harm[s] and humiliate[s] the children.”243 Even though
the ability to procreate “is not . . . a prerequisite for a valid marriage,” the Court
clearly identified that the stability that marriage brings to parenting is an essential
factor in recognizing a same-sex couple’s right to marry. 244 The Court also realized
that marriage, parental rights, and childrearing—which are all protected by the Due
Process Clause—are intrinsically intertwined.
Finally, the fourth principle recognized that “marriage is a keystone of our social
order” because it bestows significant legal rights to the married couple and
“marriage is ‘the foundation of family and of society, without which there would be
neither civilization nor progress.’”245 Thus, marriage serves as a building block of
our community at a national level.246 For this reason, states have extended rights,
benefits, and responsibilities to its citizens through marriage.247 Likewise, staterecognized marriage also confers a significant degree of federal status through
thousands of provisions.248 Accordingly, the Court reasoned that, by linking
marriage to a constellation of rights and benefits, the states have made the right to
marry a fundamental right and excluding same-sex couples from these rights is
stigmatizing, demeaning, and “lock[s] them out of a central institution of the
Nation’s society.”249

240. Id. “Marriage responds to the universal fear that a lonely person might call out only to find no
one there. It offers the hope of companionship and understanding and assurance that while both still live
there will be someone to care for the other.” Id. at 667.
241. Id. at 668; see also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (“[T]he right to ‘marry,
establish a home and bring up children’ is a central part of the liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause.”).
242. Id. (reasoning that because “many same-sex couples [already] provide loving and nurturing homes
to their children, whether biological or adopted,” the children will ultimately “suffer the significant
material costs of being raised by unmarried parents”).
243. Id.
244. Id. at 669.
245. Id. (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888)).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 670 (“These aspects of marital status include: taxation; inheritance and property rights; rules
of intestate succession; spousal privilege in the law of evidence; hospital access; medical decision making
authority; adoption rights; the rights and benefits of survivors; birth and death certificates; professional
ethics rules; campaign finance restrictions; workers’ compensation benefits; health insurance; and child
custody, support, and visitation rules.”).
248. Id.
249. Id.
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Two years later, the Supreme Court affirmed Obergefell in Pavan v. Smith and
further solidified the concept that marriage and parental rights are inseparable.250 In
that case, an Arkansas law required that “the name of the mother’s male spouse []
appear on the child’s birth certificate—regardless of his biological relationship to the
child.”251 Yet the Arkansas Supreme Court had ruled that Arkansas did not need to,
when issuing a birth certificate, include the female spouses of women who give birth
in the state, despite the child being born under the same circumstances as a
heterosexual couple.252 The case was brought by two cisgender married same-sex
female couples, who had each conceived their child via anonymous sperm
donation.253 Both couples were issued birth certificates that only listed the
gestational mother as a parent—even though both parents had completed the required
paperwork.254 The couples argued that the Arkansas law violated their constitutional
rights recognized in Obergefell.255
The Supreme Court held that Arkansas’s “differential treatment [of same-sex
parents] infringes Obergefell’s commitment to provide same-sex couples ‘the
constellation of benefits that the States have linked to marriage.’”256 The Court
affirmed that, when it listed the constellation of benefits in Obergefell, it expressly
stated that both same-sex and opposite-sex couples must have equal access to “birth
and death certificates.”257 The Court reasoned that the “Arkansas law makes birth
certificates about more than just genetics”258 because even when an opposite-sex
couple conceives with artificial insemination, state law requires that both married
parents be listed on a birth certificate.259 However, the same requirement was not
applied to same-sex couples.260 Because Arkansas had used its “[birth] certificates
to give married parents a form of legal recognition that is not available to unmarried

250. See Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2077 (2017).
251. Id. at 2077. The law required that “when a married woman in Arkansas conceives a child by
means of artificial insemination, the State will—indeed, must—list the name of her male spouse on the
child’s birth certificate.” Id. at 2078 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-401(f)(1) (2015)).
252. Id. at 2077-78 (The “state law, as interpreted by the court below, allows Arkansas officials in
those very same circumstances to omit a married woman’s female spouse from her child’s birth certificate.
As a result, same-sex parents in Arkansas lack the same right as opposite-sex parents to be listed on a
child’s birth certificate, a document often used for important transactions like making medical decisions
for a child or enrolling a child in school”).
253. Id. at 2077.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 670 (2015)).
257. Id. at 2078 (quoting Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 670). The court had intentionally listed “birth and
death certificates” within the examples provided in Obergefell because “[s]everal of the plaintiffs
in Obergefell challenged a State’s refusal to recognize their same-sex spouses on their children’s birth
certificates” and the Court explicitly wished to hold “the relevant state laws unconstitutional to the extent
they treated same-sex couples differently from opposite-sex couples.” Id.
258. Id. Arkansas had defended its law by arguing that “being named on a child’s birth certificate is
not a benefit that attends marriage [but instead] . . . a device for recording biological parentage—
regardless of whether the child’s parents are married.” Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
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parents . . . Arkansas may not . . . deny married same sex couples that
recognition.”261
Thus, the Supreme Court has held and reaffirmed that same-sex couples are not
only guaranteed the right to marry, but also must be granted the same benefits
associated with marriage that are provided to opposite-sex couples. Moreover, this
“constellation of benefits,” as well as the foundation that guarantees the right to
marry, are fundamentally intertwined with parental rights. Therefore, it is not a far
stretch to imagine that extending citizenship to a child born to same-sex parents
ought to be considered a benefit within the constellation of benefits of marriage.
Without such a benefit, United States citizen parents may not rear their children
within the United States and their children surely face the stigma of knowing that
because of the circumstances of their birth, their family is lesser.
Pavan supports the understanding that states must extend their presumption of
parentage laws to married same-sex couples where one of the spouses gives birth to
the child.262 Moreover, some states have made their marriage-based presumptive
parentage laws gender-neutral to align with Pavan and Obergefell.263 However,
these revised, gender-neutral presumptions cannot apply to cisgender same-sex male
couples because neither parent can give birth to their child. 264 Thus, even these
statutes do not meet the requirements of Obergefell and Pavan. Similarly, when the
State Department grants immigration benefits to opposite-sex couples and cisgender
same-sex female couples, but withholds such benefits from cisgender same-sex male
couples, it violates the cisgender same-sex male parents’ due process and equal
protection rights.
B. Bostock: A Shift in How the Supreme Court May View Discrimination on the
Basis of Sexual Orientation
In Bostock v. Clayton County, the Supreme Court extended Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act, which prohibits discriminatory employment decisions based on “race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin,”265 to also prohibit an employer from firing a
person for being gay or transgender.266 Bostock consolidated three cases, all of which
involved long-term employees who were fired shortly after their employers learned
of their sexual orientation or transgender identity and “allegedly for no reason other
than the employee’s [sexual orientation or transgender identity].”267 The Court
reached its decision by accepting a position that has been long-promoted by
LGTBQIA activists in the fight for marriage equality: discrimination on the basis of

261. Id. at 2078-79.
262. Feinberg, supra note 10, at 1511.
263. Id. (“[S]tates have been able to extend laws providing marriage-based avenues of establishing
parentage to female same-sex couples simply by adopting gender neutral language to refer to the person
who is deemed a parent on the basis of their marriage to the individual who gave birth.”).
264. Feinberg, supra note 10, at 1511 (“Cisgender male same-sex couples . . . , however, continue to
be excluded from marriage-based avenues of establishing parentage.”).
265. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
266. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020).
267. Id.
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sexual orientation or gender identity is a form of sex-based discrimination.268 The
Court’s reasoning, although narrowly addressing the scope of sex-based
discrimination prohibited by Title VII, is both compelling and broad-sweeping, and
it may have implications that extend far beyond the Civil Rights Act.
In beginning its analysis, the Court considered the plain meaning of “sex,” as
well as how the word “sex” is used within the 1964 Act.269 The Court, citing prior
precedent on the issue, affirmed that Title VII creates a but-for causation test, which
“directs [a court] to change one thing at a time and see if the outcome changes.” 270
If a single sex-based cause changes the outcome, regardless of other contributing
factors, then such a decision “is enough to trigger the law.” 271 In other words,
regardless of any pretextual or legitimate reasons for an employment decision, if just
one intentional, outcome-determinative reason was based on sex, the employer is
subject to Title VII.272 The Court also recognized that Title VII’s prohibitions are
specific to an “individual, [and] not groups,” which is significant because, otherwise,
the employer could “treat men and women as groups more or less equally” but still
discriminate against an individual.273
From this foundation, the Court concluded that “it is impossible to discriminate
against a person for being homosexual or transgender without discriminating against
that individual based on sex.”274 Justice Gorsuch, writing for the Court, provided a
clear example:
Consider . . . an employer with two employees, both of whom are attracted to men.
The two individuals are, to the employer’s mind, materially identical in all respects,
except that one is a man and the other a woman. If the employer fires the male
employee for no reason other than the fact he is attracted to men, the employer
discriminates against him for traits or actions it tolerates in his female colleague.

268. Compare id. (“An employer who fires an individual for being homosexual or transgender fires
that person for traits or actions it would not have questioned in members of a different sex.”), with Baker
v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 905 (Vt. 1999) (Johnson, J., concurring) (“[A] man is denied the right to marry
another man because his would-be partner is a man, not because one or both are gay. Thus, an individual’s
right to marry a person of the same sex is prohibited solely on the basis of sex, not on the basis of sexual
orientation.”).
269. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739. The Court never fully considered what the term “sex” meant in the
1964 statute, rather, they assumed that the word “refer[s] only to biological distinctions between male and
female” because the parties had all conceded to the application of this definition. Id. at 1739. However,
this definition of sex is arguably narrow and binary, and fails to consider “sex-linked traits, such as
anatomy, sexual orientation, gender presentation, and gender identity.” Shirley Lin, Dehumanization
“Because of Sex”: The Multiaxial Approach to the Rights of Sexual Minorities, 24 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 731, 738-39 (2020).
270. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739 (citing Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 346, 350,
360 (2013)).
271. Id. The Court reasoned that if Congress wanted the courts to adopt a stricter approach, then they
would have used words to indicate it, such as “solely” or “primarily because of.” Id. at 1739-40.
272. The Court concluded that “an employer who intentionally treats a person worse because of sex—
such as by firing the person for actions or attributes it would tolerate in an individual of another sex—
discriminates against that person in violation of Title VII.” Id. at 1740. Title VII prohibits an employer
from “otherwise . . . discriminat[ing] against” an employee, however, in disparate treatment cases, “the
difference in treatment based on sex must be intentional.” Id.
273. Id. at 1740-41.
274. Id. at 1741.
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Put differently, the employer intentionally singles out an employee to fire based in
part on the employee’s sex, and the affected employee’s sex is a but-for cause of his
discharge.275

In other words, an employer who fires someone because they are homosexual or
transgender must, in part, intend to penalize the employee based on their sex. 276
Thus, “homosexuality and transgender status are inextricably bound up with sex.”277
That is not to say that the Court views the two as the same; they are distinct concepts,
but “discrimination based on homosexuality or transgender status necessarily entails
discrimination based on sex; [and] the first cannot happen without the second.”278
In dissent, Justice Alito reasoned that “sex,” as used in 1964, cannot support the
Court’s application in Bostock.279 Looking directly to a 1964 provision within the
INA, Justice Alito highlighted that individuals were previously excluded from the
United States if they were “afflicted with psychopathic personality,”280 which the
Court, in Boutilier v. INS, interpreted to include persons who are gay.281 According
to Justice Alito, because the Court did not find impermissible sex-based
discrimination within that INA provision, the term “sex,” as used in 1964, could not
have meant to include sexual orientation or transgender status. 282 Justice Alito
concluded that “in 1964, it was as clear as clear could be that [‘because of sex’]
meant discrimination because of the genetic and anatomical characteristics that men
and women have at the time of birth.”283
However, Justice Alito’s argument is unconvincing and cannot support the
weight of his erroneous conclusion. First, Boutilier did not raise a claim of sex-based
discrimination.284 Thus, Justice Alito’s central argument is merely supported by
dicta. Second, Justice Alito’s premise that the Court is changing the definition of
“sex” is misplaced. The Court’s reasoning in Bostock does not alter the definition of
“sex” to make it synonymous with sexual orientation and transgender status. In fact,
Justice Gorsuch is explicit that the Court did not alter the meaning of “sex.” 285
Rather, the Court merely recognized that an employer cannot discriminate on the
basis of sexual orientation or transgender status without also considering that

275. Id.
276. Id. at 1745.
277. Id. at 1742 (“[D]iscrimination on [the basis of homosexuality or transgender status] . . . requires
an employer to intentionally treat individual employees differently because of their sex.”). “There is
simply no escaping the role intent plays here: Just as sex is necessarily a but-for cause when an employer
discriminates against homosexual or transgender employees, an employer who discriminates on these
grounds inescapably intends to rely on sex in its decision making.” Id.
278. Id. at 1746-47.
279. See id. at 1755-56 (Alito, J., dissenting).
280. Id. at 1771 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1964) (current version at INA §
212(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)).
281. Id. at 1771 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118 (1967)). In Boutilier, the
Court upheld that a person’s sexual orientation could be grounds for deportation. Id. (Alito, J., dissenting).
282. See id. (Alito, J., dissenting).
283. Id. at 1756 (Alito, J., dissenting).
284. Boutilier, 387 U.S. at 118-119 (the narrow issue concerned whether “psychopathic personality”
was overly vague and whether the term included an individual’s homosexuality).
285. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739 (“[F]or argument’s sake, we proceed on the assumption that ‘sex’ . . .
refer[s] only to biological distinctions between male and female.”).
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person’s sex.286 Finally, Justice Alito fails to recognize that the term “sex” within
the Civil Rights Act has been interpreted since 1964 to include other concepts that
were not explicitly illuminated by Congress. For instance, Title VII was later
recognized to prohibit sexual harassment and discrimination based on parental
status.287 Thus, if Justice Alito’s conclusion was strictly applied, numerous Title VII
opinions may also be invalidated.
Finally, it is reasonable to consider whether the Court’s reclassification of
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or transgender status—as a subtype
of sex-based discrimination—could be expanded beyond the scope of Title VII. In
response to the concern that its reasoning might have expansive implications, the
Court did not explicitly preempt the possibility of future claims attempting to apply
its reasoning to other legal frameworks. Rather, the Court seemed to invite such
future actions by simply stating that “none of these other [possibly implicated] laws
are before us.”288 Although Justice Gorsuch declined an invitation to acknowledge
just how far the ripples of his reasoning might go, Justice Alito suggested that “[o]ver
100 federal statutes [that] prohibit discrimination because of sex” would be
implicated.289
Justice Alito pointed out that, even though the Fourteenth Amendment and Title
VII have “important differences[,] . . . the Court’s decision may exert a gravitational
pull in constitutional cases.”290 Referencing Sessions v. Morales-Santana, Justice
Alito suggested that the reasoning applied in Bostock might also apply to the Equal
Protection Clause framework, which “prohibits sex-based discrimination unless a
‘heightened’ standard of review is met.”291 Under this heightened standard, the
government must provide an “exceedingly persuasive justification” and show that
the law “serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means
employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.”292 In
contrast, a law that does not draw a distinction based on a suspect classification
receives only rational basis review, under which the “law must bear a rational
relationship to a legitimate government purpose.”293 Therefore, Justice Alito is
286. Id. at 1743.
287. In 1998, the Court held that sexual harassment falls within in the meaning of sex-based
discrimination and was prohibited by Title VII. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75,
82 (1998) (“[W]e conclude that sex discrimination consisting of same-sex sexual harassment is actionable
under Title VII.”). In 1971, the Court found an employer’s refusal to hire women with children and
willingness to hire men with children discriminated partially on the basis of sex and was impermissible
under Title VII. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971).
288. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1753.
289. Id. at 1778 (Alito, J., dissenting) (implicating Title IX, the Fair Housing Act, and Equal Credit
Opportunity Act).
290. Id. at 1783 (Alito, J., dissenting).
291. Id. (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1689 (2017)).
The reasoning in Bostock “may have effects that extend well beyond the domain of federal
antidiscrimination statues.” Id. (Alito, J., dissenting). It is just a matter of time before “[t]he entire Federal
Judiciary will be mired for years in disputes about the reach of the Court’s reasoning.” Id. (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
292. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1690 (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996))
(emphasis added).
293. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (emphasis added). While a traditional rational basis
analysis places the burden on the petitioner to prove that the law is not rationally related to a legitimate
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correct in suggesting that an extension of Bostock’s reasoning would subject
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or transgender status to a higher
level of scrutiny than it currently receives under the Equal Protection Clause.294 If
homosexuality and transgender status are inextricably bound up in sex, then
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or transgender status should not be
subjected to rational basis, but instead, the same standard of review used for sexbased discrimination: intermediate scrutiny.
Although Justice Alito’s interpretation of the word “sex” is unconvincing at best,
he was correct in concluding that Bostock’s impacts on numerous federal statutes
could be tremendous. The Bostock Court, although directly discussing Title VII,
found a strong but-for link between sex-based discrimination and LGBTQIA status.
The Court’s reasoning is compelling and has implications that extend far beyond
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Thus, the Supreme Court may one day scrutinize
laws that draw distinctions based on sexual orientation or transgender status to the
same degree as sex-based distinctions. Until then, courts will inevitably grapple with
how the broad-sweeping reasoning in Bostock fits within the Equal Protection
framework, as well as within other federal statutes—such as the INA.
C. Bostock’s Potential Impacts on the INA
The Supreme Court has previously considered whether section 309 of the INA
(children born out of wedlock) unconstitutionally discriminates on the basis of sex.
Section 309 proscribes differential treatment for “mothers” and “fathers.”295 In part,
section 309(a) requires that “fathers” establish a blood relationship between them
and the child.296 “Mothers,” on the other hand, do not have any burden to establish
their parental relationship with their child.297 In Nguyen v. INS, the Court held that
section 309(a)’s different standards for “mothers” and “fathers” does not violate the
equal protection component of the Due Process Clause.298 In part, this is because
mothers are always present at the child’s birth, generating authenticated birth records
and providing guarantees of legitimacy.299 In contrast, a child’s birth is not
“incontrovertible proof of fatherhood” because a father does not need to be
physically present during the child’s birth.300 Therefore, Nguyen demonstrates that
section 309(a) is subject to the equal protection guarantees of the Constitution, even
though it has, thus far, withstood sex-based discrimination claims.301
However, section 309 of the INA also proscribes different residency
requirements for United States citizen “mothers” and “fathers.” 302 If a child is born
out of wedlock to a United States citizen “father,” then the “father” must also meet
government purpose, for laws that are “born of animosity towards the class of persons affected,” the Court
may shift at least part of the burden to the government. Id. at 634-35.
294. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1783 (Alito, J., dissenting).
295. Compare INA § 309(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a), with INA § 309(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c).
296. Id. § 309(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a).
297. See id. § 309(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c).
298. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001).
299. Id. at 62-64.
300. See id. at 62.
301. Id. at 74.
302. See INA § 309, 8 U.S.C. § 1409.
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the residency requirements of section 301(g) (five years) in order for their child to
be a citizen from birth.303 In contrast, the statutory language of section 309(c) only
requires “mothers” to meet a one-year residency requirement.304 However, in
Sessions v. Morales-Santana, the Court held that section 309’s different residency
requirements for “mothers” and “fathers” violated the equal protection guarantees
implicit within the Due Process Clause because it constituted an impermissible sexbased distinction.305
In Morales-Santana, the plaintiff, a child of a United States citizen father
seeking citizenship from birth, alleged that section 309 impermissibly discriminated
against his father based on his father’s sex.306 Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court,
concluded that section 309(c) must be applied in a manner that was free from sexbased discrimination.307 However, due to the legislative history and construction of
section 309(c), which was interpreted to ensure that fathers were sufficiently tied to
the United States, the Court reasoned that it could not merely apply the lower
standard for unwed mothers to unwed fathers.308 Additionally, after pointing to a
line of cases, the Court reasoned that it ordinarily extends a residency requirement,
rather than nullify it.309 Following that approach, the Court decided to “strik[e] the
discriminatory exception” for mothers and extend the residency requirement for
mothers to make it equal to that of fathers (i.e., five years).310 Thus, the Court
ultimately held that unwed mothers, like unwed fathers, must meet the more stringent
residency requirements within section 301(g).311
Morales-Santana and Nguyen confirm that the equal protection guarantees of
the Due Process Clause apply to the entirety of section 309 of the INA. As Justice
Alito correctly identified, it is only a matter of time before we begin to see LGBTQIA
discrimination claims that request courts to apply the broad-sweeping reasoning in
Bostock to other constitutional doctrines—such as the equal protection guarantees of
the Due Process Clause. In fact, the Biden Administration has positioned the Court’s
reasoning in Bostock as a cornerstone in its initiative to combat discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation and transgender status, including laws other than the Civil
Rights Act.312 Therefore, it is worthwhile to consider how the reasoning in Bostock

303. Id. § 309(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1409(b).
304. Id. § 309(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c); see also supra notes 124-28 and accompanying text.
305. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1686 (2017).
306. Id. at 1688.
307. Id. at 1688-1701.
308. Id. at 1698.
309. Id. at 1699 (citing Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89 (1979)).
310. Id.
311. Id. at 1701 (quoting Levin v. Com. Energy, Inc., 560 U.S. 413, 427 (2010)) (the Court “must
adopt the remedial course Congress likely would have chosen ‘had it been apprised of the constitutional
infirmity’”).
312. Exec. Order No. 13988, 86 Fed. Reg. 7023, 7023 (Jan. 20, 2021) (“Preventing and Combatting
Discrimination on the Basis of Gender Identity or Sexual Orientation”). The Biden Administration
recognized that Bostock’s reasoning extends to other laws that prohibit sex discrimination, including Title
IX, the Fair Housing Act, and the INA. Id. The executive order demands a review of all administrative
actions that “are or may be inconsistent” with the Biden Administration’s policy of prohibiting
“discrimination on the basis of gender identity or sexual orientation” under laws that prohibit sex-based
discrimination. Id. at 7023-24. Nonetheless, adjudication on the merits by the Supreme Court remains
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might apply to provisions within the INA that discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation, such as sections 301 and 309 of the INA—as applied through the FAM.
If Bostock may be applied to these claims, the Court would no longer subject
LGBTQIA-based discrimination to rational basis review. Instead, such claims would
be analyzed through the lens of intermediate scrutiny. This is an important
consideration because if the Supreme Court were to find that citizenship status is not
within the constellation of benefits associated with marriage, then the Court might
conclude that the State Department has not infringed upon a married couple’s
fundamental right when it denies their child citizenship from birth. If that were the
result, married cisgender same-sex male couples would not have cognizable
substantive due process claims and would need to rely, exclusively, upon the Court’s
equal protection analysis. Applying the reasoning of Bostock in such situations
would provide some additional protections for these families because they would
undeniably fare better under intermediate scrutiny rather than rational basis review.
III. ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS
As detailed earlier in this Comment, courts’ use of the cannon of constitutional
avoidance or mootness have, thus far, provided inadequate relief. Because the relief
granted in Kiviti, Mize, and Dvash-Banks only have local impacts within Maryland,
Georgia, and the Ninth Circuit, there is no guarantee that a similarly situated child in
another state would receive the same relief from that state’s federal court. This
jurisdictional divide will undoubtedly cause at least some, if not most, married
cisgender same-sex male couples to make two stops after returning to the United
States with their child conceived through international ART services: first to the
State Department to apply for the passport; and then second, to the federal courts in
order to challenge the State Department’s denial. In contrast, a similarly situated
opposite-sex couple is unlikely to need to make the second stop. Moreover, the State
Department’s disparate treatment of married cisgender same-sex male couples is
bound to repeat itself until the Supreme Court weighs in and issues a decision.
Ultimately, the Court should conclude that the State Department’s disparate
application of section 301 and section 309 is unconstitutional. This conclusion will
likely be based upon the substantive due process protections afforded to same-sex
married couples and, quite possibly, looming equal protection guarantees for sexual
orientation stemming from Bostock.
Regardless of whether Bostock is extended to the equal protection guarantees of
the Due Process Clause, the Supreme Court would likely first turn to Obergefell as
a guidepost in its constitutional analysis. Justice Kennedy’s third principle was
central to Obergefell’s holding: marriage provides families “safeguards” to
procreating, rearing children, and education. Marriage—and the benefits that
follow—provide children with recognition, stability, and predictability, and the
Court feared that children might suffer stigma if they learned that their same-sex
family was somehow lesser than an opposite-sex family. Thus, Justice Kennedy

critical because executive orders can easily be revoked by the subsequent administration and any relief
provided by executive order may only be temporary.
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made it clear that marriage, parental rights, and child rearing are all intrinsically
intertwined and protected by the Due Process Clause.
Although the Obergefell Court did not explicitly include it in the list of benefits
associated with marriage, citizenship from birth is not dissimilar from those
enumerated.313 Nonetheless, the explicitly clear premise that divides sections 301
(born in wedlock) and 309 (born out of wedlock) rests fully on whether the parents
of the child are married. Therefore, Congress itself has made citizenship from birth
a right associated with marriage and as such, has assured that it is protected by the
Due Process Clause. If citizenship from birth is presumed to be a benefit that is
protected by the fundamental right to marry, the constitutionality of the State
Department’s policy would likely turn on whether same-sex couples and oppositesex couples are treated equally. For the Kivitis, Mize and Gregg, and Dvash-Banks
families, this is simply not the case.
The FAM only requires a further investigation of the circumstances of a child’s
birth if the parents both do not appear to be related to the child by blood. However,
because the consular officer is likely to presume that both parents in a cisgender
opposite-sex couple are biological parents of the child, the consular officer is far less
likely to investigate further. In contrast, the cisgender same-sex male couple will
almost always trigger further investigation because the officer will reason that they
cannot both be the biological parents of their child. As a result, the child born to the
cisgender opposite-sex couple is more likely to be considered born in wedlock, and
the parents will be analyzed under the less burdensome residency requirements of
section 301 of the INA. On the other hand, a child born to the cisgender same-sex
male couple is likely to be considered born out of wedlock, and the child’s biological
parent will be placed under the more stringent residency requirements of section 309.
Ending the analysis here, it is clear that the State Department’s treatment of oppositesex and same-sex couples is disparate and unequal.
If the analysis is taken further, the disparate impact becomes starker when one
of the same-sex couples cannot satisfy the five-year residency requirement of section
309. For families like the Kivitis, Mize and Gregg, and Dvash-Bankses, where the
biological father is a United States citizen but has not resided in the United States for
over five years, their child will be denied a passport under section 309. However, a
similarly situated, cisgender opposite-sex couple would be granted the passport
because section 301 only requires that both United States citizen parents reside in
the United States for any period prior to the child’s birth. This disparate outcome
violates Obergefell’s requirement that married opposite-sex couples and married
same-sex couples be treated equally.
Notwithstanding the Court’s analysis of these claims in light of Obergefell, an
interesting outcome results if the Court were to only address the issue through its
extension of the broad-sweeping and persuasive reasoning in Bostock. If Bostock
were extended and citizenship from birth was not found to be within the constellation
of benefits associated with marriage, or the married cisgender same-sex male couple
were only to allege an equal protection claim, the Court would likely analyze the
issue under intermediate scrutiny. This is because the couple’s sexual orientation is

313. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
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inextricably bound with sex. Under the intermediate scrutiny framework, the State
Department would need to sufficiently demonstrate that its disparate treatment of
same-sex and opposite-sex couples under sections 301 and 309 is substantially
related to an important governmental purpose. Thus, through applying the reasoning
of Bostock, the Court could review the State Department’s policy more closely than
it did in Romer, and the burden would be on the government to provide the important
interest.
In cases like the Kivitis, Mize and Gregg, and Dvash-Banks families’, the State
Department is unlikely to prevail under an equal protection analysis that has
incorporated the reasoning of Bostock. Unlike Nguyen, the issue would not be about
the requirements of section 309(a) only being applied to “fathers” and not “mothers.”
Rather, the claim would consider whether requiring a biological relationship between
the child and both parents for section 301 to apply is substantially related to an
important governmental interest. Likewise, the holding in Morales-Santana is
unlikely to control in an equal protection claim seeking to invoke the reasoning of
Bostock. This is in part because the claims would likely allege that the State
Department discriminates against married cisgender same-sex male couples when it
decides whether to apply section 301 or 309, and not the nuances of the individual
statutes themselves. In other words, it is how the State Department answers the
threshold question of a section 301 and 309 analysis (i.e., whether the child is to be
considered born in or out of wedlock) that creates this disparate outcome for
cisgender same-sex male couples and not the requirements within the statutes
themselves.
Thus, the State Department is unlikely to succeed in relying on the prior
Supreme Court jurisprudence that has validated sex-based discrimination within the
INA. Moreover, the State Department is also unlikely to succeed in relying on the
subsections of the statutes themselves. The State Department must provide an
important purpose for subjecting the married cisgender same-sex male couple to the
more stringent standards of section 309 while it subjects married cisgender oppositesex couples to the less burdensome standards of section 301.
The State Department would likely assert that the important purpose of its policy
is to assure that children are sufficiently connected to their parents before obtaining
citizenship from birth and that any disparate impact is minimal; however, it is
unlikely to prevail on this argument for a number of reasons. First, the three cases
addressed in this Comment underscore that the FAM continues to disparately impact
cisgender same-sex male couples and that, until a national conclusion is reached on
the issue, future cases are likely to arise. Moreover, denying infants citizenship from
birth and subsequently requiring that a family redetermine where to raise their child
is hardly minimal. Second, there are more narrowly tailored means for the State
Department to assure that both fathers in a married cisgender same-sex couple are
sufficiently connected to their child, such as through considering birth certificates,
court orders determining parenthood, and marriage certificates. Finally, any State
Department-alleged important interest is unlikely to align with the overall legislative
intent of the INA: liberal treatment of children and keeping families united. Thus,
the State Department’s burden under the equal protection guarantees of the Due
Process Clause is likely insurmountable.
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CONCLUSION
Even though K.R.K., S.M.-G., and E.J. were recognized to be United States
citizens from birth under section 301 of the INA, all three courts took different routes
to arrive at the same result. It is easy to assume that these results bolster the argument
that section 301 does not require a biological relationship to apply; however, upon
further inspection, the result is more concerning than it first appears. The canon of
constitutional avoidance, by definition, allows a court to circumvent the
constitutional issue by merely predicting that a statutory interpretation might
interfere with a constitutional protection. Failing to adjudicate the constitutional
issue leaves future litigants and courts questioning whether a constitutional
protection actually exists. Second, as exemplified in Mize, not all agree that the plain
text of section 301 does not require that both parents share a biological tie to their
child. If a court were to use this interpretation, and simultaneously fail to invoke the
canon of constitutional avoidance, the child might be denied citizenship from birth.
Finally, and most importantly, without nationwide recognition of a married samesex couple’s constitutional right for their child to derive citizenship from birth, the
State Department’s discriminatory pattern and practice is likely to continue. A
family with a birth plan identical to the Kiviti, Mize and Gregg, or Dvash-Banks
families may be denied a passport for their child if they apply at a State Department
office that falls outside of the Ninth Circuit, Maryland, or Georgia’s jurisdictional
reach.
If the Supreme Court were to analyze these claims on their constitutional merits,
it should find that the State Department’s disparate treatment of married cisgender
same-sex male couples undermines the substantive due process and equal protection
guarantees of the Due Process Clause. Obergefell held that opposite-sex and samesex couples must be on the same terms and conditions, and that same-sex couples
must have equal access to the same constellation of rights and benefits. Granting a
child citizenship from birth ought to be considered a right and benefit closely
associated with marriage and as such, the State Department infringes on the samesex couple’s fundamental rights when they deny their marital child citizenship from
birth but do not do the same for a similarly situated opposite-sex couple.
Alternatively, if the Court were to only address the equal protection claim, the Court
might also be inclined to include the broad-sweeping and compelling reasoning of
Bostock. This would place the significant burden on the State Department to
withstand intermediate scrutiny, which it is unlikely to meet.
Therefore, if we are to adequately address the discriminatory treatment of
cisgender same-sex male couples seeking recognition of their child’s citizenship, we
must do more than the district courts have done thus far. These decisions provide
inadequate relief. Likewise, administrative policies are unlikely to provide longlasting relief because subsequent administrations can revoke these policies far easier
than a legislative amendment to the INA or Supreme Court precedent. Because it is
unlikely that Congress will address this issue anytime soon, long-term relief may
only come through the Supreme Court analyzing these claims on their constitutional
merits. Until then, the State Department’s disparate treatment of married cisgender
same-sex male parents who decide to grow their families through international ART
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services remains possible, and these parents are left with the ambiguity of whether
their child’s citizenship from birth is a benefit associated with their marriage.

